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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ever since the beginning of the nineties, interconnection pricing emerged as a high priority
regulatory policy question. As more and more state-owned monopolies were privatized,
their essential facility (or simply their network) had to be opened to competition. The
most viable practice was call-by- call services in telecommunications markets. Entrants
were allowed to buy capacity of the incumbent's network in order to provide service to
customers. Because the incumbent always has an incentive to foreclose the market, these
agreements between incumbent and entrant were and still are in the focus of regulatory
authorities all over the world.
Although this so-called one-way interconnection model is still valid, competition be-
tween fully edged networks has become of growing importance. Today cable providers
are also capable of oering telecommunication services. However they dispose of a mature
network and can bypass the former incumbent's essential facility. Early models of network
competition, such as Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) and Armstrong (1998) highlight the
collusive role of interconnection charges in these settings. Hence the regulator is called
for.
The present thesis looks at instruments that can be used to regulate interconnection
markets. It is comprised of three papers on access pricing in one-way as well as in two-
way interconnection models. Chapter 2 looks at instruments that can be employed by the
regulator, chapters 3 and 4 introduce fully decentralized mechanisms, where the role of
the regulator is reduced to a minimum.
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Chapter 2 introduces a one-way interconnection model with a vertically integrated
incumbent and an entrant who uses the incumbent network. Firms produce dierentiated
services and compete for customers. Traditional literature on interconnection pricing
uses primarily per-unit access charges, hence the interconnection payment depends on
the overall amount of trac exchanged. In this paper we present a dierent approach to
pricing interconnection. Because products are dierentiated, the demand for end service is
directly dependent on both rms' retail prices. We generalize the access payment function
and make it solely dependent on market prices. I show that a per-unit access price is a
special case of a contract on both rms' retail prices. Because such a function uses at
least two instruments, we are able to reproduce specic access charge rules. Furthermore,
due to the increased number of instruments, the set of possible outcomes is increased as
compared to a per-unit access charge.
By comparing dierent benchmark cases and computing their respective parameters,
we show that they can be used as a preliminary measure of goodness of the access mecha-
nism. Additionally, we show that bill & keep, that is providing access free of charge, yields
lower retail prices than regulating a per-unit access charge at cost.
Chapter 3 uses the ndings of chapter 2 and introduces as particular mechanism based
on rms' retail prices. We use the exact same model of industry structure, i.e. a vertically
integrated incumbent and an entrant, that uses network capacity as an essential input.
Product market competition is imperfect, i.e. products are dierentiated.
The access pricing mechanism is fully decentralized, i.e. other than setting up the
rules of the game, the regulator does not intervene in the market at all. This is a partic-
ular strength of our mechanism, since traditional access pricing rules always require the
regulator to dispose of almost full market information1. The access payment mechanism
is modeled as a game between the incumbent and the entrant. Each rm determines a
parameter in a linear payment function on rms' downstream retail prices. We show that
this results in lower prices and higher welfare than the regulated per-unit access charge
approach. Furthermore we present conditions for which the equilibrium in the model
1Of course, asymmetric information models have been employed to regulatory problems, the classical
paper is certainly Baron and Myerson (1982). Vickers (1995) applies their analysis to telecommunications
industries. In chapter 3 the regulator has no information whatsoever, which is an even stronger assumption
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coincides with the optimal Ramsey outcome.
Chapter 4 draws on the literature pioneered by Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a),
Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) and Armstrong (1998). It uses a two-way interconnection
model, with network-based price discrimination, i.e. rms charge dierent prices for their
own and the competitor's network. The paper of Gans and King (2001) shows, that when
rms are able to charge two-part taris, a per-unit access charge is used as a collusive
device. The optimal equilibrium access charge is below marginal cost, hence customers
save on o-net calls. However this is more than oset by an increase in the at payment
and overall welfare is reduced as compared to a regime with access priced at marginal cost
Using a consumer's net-utility function we derive a new retail price mechanism. Instead
of competing in at fees, rms oer net-utility levels. In that case, the monthly payment
is derived from the equilibrium net-utility level and the gross utility of making calls to
both networks. The paper shows that using such a mechanism eliminates the collusive
power of access charge is vanished and overall welfare is increased.
Since net-utility is a function of the at payment, the result is reminiscent of the
literature on Bertrand and Cournot Competition with substitutes. We employ a graph-
ical argument used in Cheng (1985) to show that competition in net-utility levels is a
dominated strategy. The same is true for price competition when prices are complements.
Chapter 2
Evaluating Interconnection
Agreements
2.1 Introduction
Interconnection pricing emerged as one of single most important problems after the wave
of regulation started swamping network industries in the early nineties.
In a nutshell, the theory (and practice) of interconnection pricing1 is concerned with
nding the right compensation for using another agent's essential facility. For network
industries such as telecommunications, energy, railroad or postal services this is a phys-
ical network. In order to provide service to customers, rms have to be granted ac-
cess to the owner's network. The rates and terms at which access is allowed is the ac-
cess/interconnection price.
Despite the importance of access pricing in practice, the only contractual form that has
been studied intensively is the per-unit access price23. The literature on interconnection
pricing takes this per-unit contract as given and derives optimal access pricing rules, most
notably the Ecient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and optimal Ramsey prices.
1Throughout the paper we use both access and interconnection pricing equally.
2For extensive surveys on interconnection theory and policy, the reader is referred to Laont and Tirole
(2000) and Armstrong (2002b)
3A notable exemption is Jeon and Hurkens (forthcoming). He studies access pricing contracts that are
not only conditioned on output but also on prices.
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There are two reasons why this approach is questionable. First of all, a per-unit access
contract is only one special scheme of many possibilities. It seems unreasonable to restrict
one's options in such a way that market outcomes are excluded ex ante. Secondly optimal
per-unit access pricing requires information that may not be easily to acquire in reality.
Network industries are generally governed by large amounts of xed (sunk) cost4 and
very small marginal cost. Hence charging per-unit prices might not be cost eective after
all, because on the one hand, there might be no cost associated to the unit, prices are
based on. On the other hand, cost accounting procedures and deriving cost estimates is
costly in itself. Major telecommunications companies spend a non-negligible fraction of
budget to compute estimates of marginal cost whose sole purpose is reporting to regulatory
authorities.
In the paper we want to examine these two points in particular. We use a simple
model of one-way interconnection with an incumbent who is the owner of a network and
an entrant who acquires network service in order to produce a service. Both rms compete
in prices by oering dierentiated products.
Given the model framework we compute access pricing formulas, that are proposed in
the literature. Using a simple access payment function, that is based on both customer
prices, we show that it is possible to reproduce these results. Furthermore this intercon-
nection payment is able to implement more market outcomes than regulating a per-unit
access charge because there are more instruments available. Additionally it gives a sim-
ple indication, which access payment is socially preferable, without using any additional
information.
Finally the paper opts in favour of xed fee compensation as compared to access price
regulation. It is shown show that under the assumption of substitutable services, marginal
(access) prices of zero are welfare improving. This also takes account of the inherent cost
structure of the industries with large xed cost and negligible marginal cost.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the general model proofs
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and computes benchmarks. In section 2.3 we
analyze dierent access pricing schemes and derive the main results of the paper, section
4.5 concludes.
4The impact of sunk costs is discussed in Hausman (1997).
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Network Service cTPhase 1:
Service 1 cS1 Service 2 c
S
2Phase 2:
Figure 2.1: Production Structure
2.2 A Stylized Model
2.2.1 Multiproduct Monopoly
Consider a monopolist M who produces to two dierentiated services, service 1 and 2.
Production of either service requires two inputs. The rst one is the essential facility,
in our case a network which is owned by M . For each unit of end service, M incurs a
marginal cost of cT (see gure 2.1).
The second component is service specic, i.e. for each unit of service 1, the rm incurs
a cost of cS1 and for providing one unit of service 2, c
S
2 is incurred. For the reminder of
the paper we assume that cS1 = c
S
2 = c
S The production ow is depicted in gure 2.1. We
assume that in order to produce service i 2 f1; 2g, the monopolist has to incur a service
specic xed cost Fi.
This is a simple model of a telecommunications industry with one rm supplying both
services, voice and data. Network service, i.e. provision, maintenance and operation of
the physical network is the essential input. Service 1 and 2 may be interpreted as voice
and data applications.
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Products are imperfect substitutes, hence the monopolist faces dierentiated demands
for both services. Demand for end service i is given by
qi = qi(pi; pj) 8 i 2 f1; 2g i 6= j
with derivatives satisfying
@qi(pi;pj)
@pi
< 0
@2qi(pI ;pj)
@pI2
 0 @2qi(pI ;pj)@pI@pj  0 8 i 2 fI; Eg i 6= j:
Having dened the production process as well as the demand side, M 's prot function
is given by
M = (p1   cT   cS)q1(p1; p2)  F1 + (p1   cT   cS)q2(p1; p2)  F2
M maximizes his prot by nding optimal retail prices. These prices have to satisfy
the rst-order conditions5
(pM1   cT   cS)
@q1(p
M
1 ; p
M
2 )
@pM1
+ q1(p
M
1 ; p
M
2 ) + (p
M
2   cT   cS)
@q2(p
M
1 ; p
M
2 )
@pM1
= 0(2.1)
(pM2   cT   cS)
@q2(p
M
1 ; p
M
2 )
@pM2
+ q2(p
M
1 ; p
M
2 ) + (p
M
1   cT   cS)
@q1(p
M
1 ; p
M
2 )
@pM2
= 0(2.2)
For the market to be viable, M  0 i.e.
(pM1   cT   cS)q1(pM1 ; pM2 ) + (pM2   cT   cS)q2(pM1 ; pM2 )  F1 + F2
.
In equilibrium both services are oered at a price above marginal cost cT + cS and
both services are bought. Let us now introduce the interconnection model, where network
service is supplied as an input to an entrant and the incumbent, i.e. the former monopolist
competes in the market for end services.
2.2.2 One-way Interconnection
Suppose that service 2 is provided by another rm, the entrant6 E. In order to do so, he
has to acquire network services from the incumbent I, who is proprietary of a physical
network. In return, E has to make an access payment A(pI ; pE). The industry is depicted
in gure 2.2.
5We assume that the second order conditions are satised, hence (2.1) and (2.2) characterize a maximum.
6From here on, all variables related to E are indexed with an E instead of a 2. Subsequently, all
incumbent's variables are indexed with an I.
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A(pI ; pE)
qI qE
qI qEpI pE
Network
Services
Customer
Services (I)
Customer
Services (E)
End Service Market
Figure 2.2: Up and Downstream Market
Providing a unit of either I or E's service requires a unit of network service and one
unit of service specic input. Firm I provides a unit of capacity at marginal cost of cT .
The service specic input is provided by each rm at marginal cost of cS . The access
payment A(pI ; pE) is an arbitrary function of both retail prices. We implicitly assume
that the cost of setting up a new fully edged network is prohibitively high and bypass is
not possible in any way. Firm I is a natural monopolist in the upstream market.
The model is build with telecommunications industry in mind. Network service is the
transmission of data, which is provided by the network owner. Individual services such
as voice services, email, P2P and the like are provided by independent rms who employ
this network. They compete with the network proprietary who also oers a dierentiated
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service using his network7.
Equipped with the building blocks of the model, we can write both rms' prot func-
tions as
I = (pI   cT   cS)qI(pI ; pE)  cT qE(pI ; pE) +A(pI ; pE)  FI (2.3)
E = (pE   cS)qE(pI ; pE) A(pI ; pE)  FE (2.4)
The model is setup as a two-stage game. In stage one, the access mechanism is deter-
mined. This involves the structure and the level of the payment. In stage two, rms set
their prices simultaneously given A(pI ; pE). Note that this is a game of full information.
Hence the rst-order conditions in the second stage of the game are given by
(pI   cT   cS)@qI(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ qI(pI ; pE)  cT @qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
+
@A(pI ; pE)
@pI
= 0 (2.5)
(pE   cS)@qE(pI ; pE)
@pE
+ qE(pI ; pE)  @A(pI ; pE)
@pE
= 0 (2.6)
Almost all contributions on access or interconnection pricing make a very specic
functional assumption on A(pI ; pE). They use linear per-unit access prices
8, so the access
payment is proportional to the entrants demand. Notice that by assuming a dierentiated
goods demand, using a per unit access charge a is a special case of our arbitrary function
A(pI ; pE) since
A(pI ; pE) = a qE(pI ; pE):
The functional form imposed on A(pI ; pE) is determined by the demand function. The
level of a is either set by the incumbent or regulated in some form.
2.2.3 Existence and Uniqueness
Let us begin the formal analysis by stating the the following proposition:
7Although the adjacency to telecommunications industries is apparent, the model can also be employed
to traditional industries. We may think of a producer of tower cranes who rents his cranes to construction
rms and at the same time sells his products to competitors who also rent cranes.
8An exception is Jeon and Hurkens (forthcoming). He uses an arbitrary mechanism that, in equilibrium,
depends on the structure of marginal cost.
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Proposition 2.1. In the game described by (2.3) and (2.4) exists an equilibrium price
pair pI and p

E whenever
cT
@2qE(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
  (pI   cT   cS)@
2qI(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
  @qI(pI ; pE)
@pE
 @
2A(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
(2.7)
(pE   cS)@
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pE@pI
+
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
 @
2A(pI ; pE)
@pE@pI
(2.8)
The equilibrium is unique, if cT close to zero.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2.1 says that whenever the access payment function's curvature is moderate
enough (neither too convex nor too concave), the game does have an equilibrium. Notice
that given the assumptions on demand, we expect the l.h.s. of (2.7) to be negative, whereas
the l.h.s. of (2.8) is positive. Hence (2.7) is a lower bound and (2.8) an upper bound to
@2A(pI ;pE)
@pI@pE
.
Note again that the access payment function A(pI ; pE) is a function of both retail
prices. Conditions (2.7) and (2.8) ensure that, the reactivity of the access payment function
with respect to either rm's end service price is not to dependent of the other rm's retail
price. In other words changes of either rm's retail price should not inuence the choice
of the other rm's end service price as the access payment function is concerned.
The proposition is best described by looking at a few benchmarks. Assume that
A(pI ; pE) = a qE(pI ; pE);
i.e. E compensates I for every unit of network service used. Using (2.7) and (2.8) and
rearranging yields:
cT
@2qE(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
  (pI   cT   cS)@
2qI(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
  @qI(pI ; pE)
@pE
 a@
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
(pE   cS)@
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pE@pI
+
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
 a@
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pE@pI
Given the assumptions on the demand curves, these inequalities are satised.
The second benchmark is the so-called Bill & Keep9 where both rms agree to not
compensate each other for the use of the competitor's network. Note that pure Bill &
9See Degraba (2000) for more details
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Keep is unrealistic in our model of one-way interconnection, since there is only one party
who has to incur cost of transmitting data, namely the incumbent. However the analysis
is instructive since it is polar case that is wroth looking at.
The access payment function is now given by
A(pI ; pE) = 0;
hence the conditions for our game to be supermodular reduce to
(pI   cT   cS)@
2qI(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
+
@qI(pI ; pE)
@pE
  cT @
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
 0
(pE   cS)@
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pE@pI
+
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
 0:
Whenever
(pI   cT   cS)@
2qI(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
+
@qI(pI ; pE)
@pE
 cT @
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
and the restrictions on the signs of the demand cross-derivatives are met, these conditions
are satised.
The last case we want to look at is a payment function of the form
A(pI ; pE) = T + a1pI + a2pE
where T , a1 and a2 are arbitrary constants taken from the set of real numbers. The
analysis is analog to the one for Bill & Keep. Cross-derivatives are zero in this case and
the conditions are satised if the restrictions above are met.
These are three cases of possible access payment functions that we encounter through-
out the paper, the per-unit access charge, an access charge independent of either prices or
quantities and a variable function of retail prices.
2.2.4 Social Optimum
For future reference, we compute Ramsey prices, i.e. prices that maximize social welfare
subject to an industry break-even condition. In order to compute conditions for the
optimal Ramsey prices we have to introduce a social welfare function W (pI ; pE). Hence
the social planner has to solve the Ramsey programm given by
max
pI ;pE
W (pI ; pE) s.t. (pI cT  cSI )qI(pI ; pE)+(pE cT  cSE)qE(pI ; pE) = FI+FE (2.9)
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The programm (3.20) yields a symmetric equilibrium with pI = pE = p
R. Furthermore
we assume that pM > pR, so that the market is viable.
2.3 Analysis of common Access pricing rules
Whenever services are substitutable10 a per-unit access charge is a special case of an
arbitrary access payment function dependent on service prices. Hence picking only one
functional form means to circumscribe the set of possible outcomes. This section presents
common per-unit access rules and shows, they can be implemented by using an arbitrary
function dependent on retail prices. Because such an arbitrary function disposes of more
instruments than a per-unit access charge, the set of possible outcomes is signicantly
larger as is the case with a per-unit access charge.
2.3.1 Cost-based Access Pricing
The notion of incremental cost is of central importance to the regulation of interconnection
charges. Baumol and Sidak (1994) elaborate on dierent cost accounting methods and
every regulatory law puts special focus on the modeling of cost of providing an incremental
unit of access.
For our purpose and the sake of the argument it is sucient to know that there exists
a notion of marginal or incremental cost that is applicable to the industry. We simply
continue to call that marginal cost cT .
In this subsection we assume that a regulator's policy goal is to set access charges
exactly equal to cT . The idea is, that an outside rm is provided with the right incentives
to enter and there is no discrimination between incumbent and entrant since either rm
has to incur the same cost in order produce the nal good.
With both I and E having the same perceived (and actual) marginal cost of production
cT of network service and product dierentiation in the downstream market, their prot
functions reduce to
I = (pI   cT   cS)qI(pI ; pE)  FI
E = (pE   cT   cS)qE(pI ; pE)  FE
10Or prices are complements.
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a duopoly with dierentiated products. Each rm maximizes its prot with respect to
their retail price. An equilibrium is characterized by the rst-order conditions
(pDI   cT   cS)
@qI(p
D
I ; p
D
E )
@pDI
+ qI(p
D
I ; p
D
E ) = 0 (2.10)
(pDE   cT   cS)
@qE(p
D
I ; p
D
E )
@pDE
+ qE(p
D
I ; p
D
E ) = 0 (2.11)
with pDI and p
D
E denoting the duopoly prices when access is priced at cost.
Now suppose that the regulator wants to implement cost based pricing by using an
arbitrary access payment function A(pI ; pE). To implement prices p
D
I and p
D
E , he has
to pick A(pI ; pE)'s slope conditions (i.e. the derivatives) such that (2.5) and (2.10) are
equated as well as (2.6) and (2.11). Solving these equalities yields conditions
@A(pI ; pE)
@pI
= cT
@qE(p
D
I ; p
D
E )
@pI
> 0 (2.12)
@A(pI ; pE)
@pE
= cT
@qE(p
D
I ; p
D
E )
@pE
< 0 (2.13)
Note that the functionA(pI ; pE) implements a point in fpI ; pEg-space, namely (pDI ; pDE ).
Hence any arbitrary function A(pI ; pE) satisfying (2.12) and (2.13) suces.
A simple 3-part tari A(pI ; pE) = T + a1pI + a2pE is an easy way to implement the
cost based access pricing solution. The parameter a1 is given by the r.h.s. of (2.12) and
a2 is given by the r.h.s. of (2.13). If the regulator is also concerned with equity among
rms, a transfer T satisfying
I(p
D
I ; p
D
E ) + T = E(p
D
I ; p
D
E )  T
yields equal prots for both rms.
In this case it is much easier to rely on a per-unit price structure because this is
where cost based pricing actually comes from. It is also informationally ecient, since its
implementation only requires cost information. It is also easy to see that
A(pI ; pE) = a qE(pI ; pE)
satises conditions (2.12) and (2.13) where a = cT in optimum.
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2.3.2 Bill & Keep
Bill & Keep, or peering (Laont, Marcus, Rey, and Tirole (2001)) as it is also called, is
an interconnection practice that is common in the Internet Industry. Large providers of
Internet infrastructure (so-called backbones), exchange trac on \a give and take" basis
without any money changing hands.
By virtue of the mechanism, we expect peering to occur in two-way interconnection
frameworks rather than in a one-way setting. Intuitively, two networks use this scheme
once o-net trac is suciently equal, i.e. a network receives as much trac from its peer
as it sends to him11.
In a one-way access framework, the equivalent to bill & keep is charging xed prices
independent of the amount of trac. Both payment schemes have the property that
the marginal price of another unit of network services is zero. However for the ease of
exposition, we relate to Bill & Keep as A(pI ; pE) = 0, hence I and E's prot functions
reduce to
I = (pI   cT   cS)qI(pI ; pE)  cT qE(pI ; pE)  FI
E = (pE   cS)qE(pI ; pE)  FE
It is straightforward to see that the rst-order conditions are given by
(pbkI   cT   cS)
@qI(p
bk
I ; p
bk
E )
@pI
+ qI(p
bk
I ; p
bk
E )  cT
@qE(p
bk
I ; p
bk
E )
@pI
= 0 (2.14)
(pbkE   cS)
@qE(p
bk
I ; p
bk
E )
@pE
+ qE(p
bk
I ; p
bk
E ) = 0 (2.15)
Since Bill & Keep is dened as A(pI ; pE) = 0 it suggests itself, that the proper mech-
anism to implement the outcome is given by
@A(pI ; pE)
@pI
= 0
@A(pI ; pE)
@pE
= 0
11Internet interconnection pricing is discussed in Laont, Marcus, Rey, and Tirole (2003) and Cremer,
Rey, and Tirole (2000). Degraba (2000) elaborates on Bill & Keep as an ecient interconnection agreement.
EVALUATING INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS 21
These conditions also hold for any trac independent xed fee and can be trivially
implemented by using a per-unit access charge a = 0.
2.3.3 Multiproduct Monopolist
Up to now we looked at access charge rules that are either derived form a per-unit in-
terconnection price (marginal cost access pricing) or trivially implemented by setting the
access price equal to zero. Other outcomes may not be implemented so easily by using
only one instrument. We show that interpreting access payment as a function of all retail
prices adds an additional instrument and therefore increases the set of possible outcomes.
Suppose that I is able to freely choose any access payment function and he possesses
all relevant market information including demand and cost parameters. Without any
restriction, I wants to achieve the highest possible prot in the market, the multiproduct
monopolist's prot analyzed in section 2.2.1. Hence his goal is to implement pM1 and p
M
2 .
He picks A(pI ; pE) such that he replicates (2.1) and (2.2). Equating (2.5) and (2.1) as
well as (2.6) and (2.2) delivers conditions on @A(pI ; pE)=@pI and @A(pI ; pE)=@pE .
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that an incumbent is free in specifying an access payment function
in a one-way interconnection model and has all relevant market information. Then his
optimal choice satises
@A(pI ; pE)
@pI
= (pME   cS)
@qE(p
M
I ; p
M
E )
@pI
> 0 (2.16)
@A(pI ; pE)
@pE
= cT
@qE(p
M
I ; p
M
E )
@pE
  (pMI   cT   cS)
@qI(p
M
I ; p
M
E )
@pE
< 0 (2.17)
The easiest way to implement the integrated monopolist's solution, requires I to use
a simple 3-part tari of the form A(pI ; pE) = T + a1pI + a2pE , where a1 is given by the
r.h.s. of (2.16) and a2 is given by the r.h.s. of (2.17). The lump sum payment T has to
satisfy
E   T  0:
This tari is only conditioned on pI and pE and it yields maximal industry prots. Fur-
thermore a1 and a2 are constants with p
M
I and p
M
E satisfying (2.1) and (2.2).
However the result could not be replicated by using a per-unit access charge alone.
The intuition is straight forward. By using a per-unit access charge, I disposes of only
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one instrument to solve two equations, namely (2:16) and (2:17). For the case of per-
unit access charges, the l.h.s. of both equations is replaced by a
 
@qI(pI ; pE)=@pI

and
a
 
@qE(pI ; pE)=@pE

respectively. Furthermore, a has to solve both equations simultane-
ously. This is not possible with only one instrument. In order to achieve joint monopoly
outcome, at least two slope conditions and an intercept12 are needed.
Corollary 2.1. Suppose an incumbent is allowed to freely specify an access function
A(pI ; pE). Then employing a linear per-unit access access price a is not sucient to
implement the integrated monopolist's solution.
This result is has been highlighted in the literature in a dierent context. Armstrong
(2002b) points out that in order to implement certain outcomes, more instruments such
as an output tax are needed.
2.3.4 Social Planner
At the other end of the spectrum, the social planner's solution maximizes overall welfare.
In this section we show that it is not possible to implement a socially optimal solution in
an industry (with or without xed cost) by using just a per-unit access charge.
Suppose that the social planner is solely concerned with regulating retail prices pE
and pI such that they equal marginal cost providing service, i.e. assume that xed cost
are zero. The idea is that by regulating the access charge mechanism, the social planner
is able to control retail prices. Again we are assuming full information on each side of
the market13. In the present setting regulating prices at the level of marginal cost means
pi = c
T + cS for i = I; E. If we want to make I and E choose these retail prices, their
rst-order conditions have to satisfy
12The intercept is needed to allocate prots among rms. However, in order to simply generate monopoly
prots, two slope conditions are sucient.
13Observe that if the the social planner had all information on demand and cost, there would be not
need to regulate the interconnection market. He could dictate prices in the retail market and make
interconnection mandatory. But for the sake of the argument we assume that the regulatory authority is
only able to intervene in the access pricing process.
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(pSI   cT   cS)
@qI(p
S
I ; p
S
E)
@pI
= 0 (2.18)
(pSE   cT   cS)
@qE(p
S
I ; p
S
E)
@pE
= 0 (2.19)
Note that pSI = c
T + cS and pSE = c
T + cS , i.e. they solve the rst-order conditions
(2.18) and (2.19). We can now state the following proposition:
Lemma 2.2. Suppose a regulator wants to implement retail prices at marginal cost by
using an access payment function of the A(pI ; pE). Then this function has to satisfy the
following properties:
@A(pI ; pE)
@pI
=  qI(cT + cS ; cT + cS) + cT @qE(c
T + cS ; cT + cS)
@pI
(2.20)
@A(pI ; pE)
@pE
= cT
@qE(c
T + cS ; cT + cS)
@pE
+ qE(c
T + cS ; cT + cS) (2.21)
Again the simple 3-part tari requires a1 and a2 to be equal to the r.h.s. of (2.20) and
(2.21). Note that the transfer payment is zero, since we abstract from xed costs in this
scenario.
Now suppose that FI > 0 and FE > 0 and the regulator's goal is to solve the Ramsey
program (3.20) and implement pI = pE = p
R.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose a regulator wants to implement optimal Ramsey prices pR and pR
by using an access payment function function of the form A(pI ; pE). Then this function
has to satisfy the following properties:
@A(pI ; pE)
@pI
=  

(pRI   cT   cS)
@qI(p
R
I ; p
R
E)
@pI
+ qI(p
R
I ; p
R
E)  cT
@qE(p
R
I ; p
R
E)
@pI

@A(pI ; pE)
@pI
= (pRE   cS)
@qE(p
R
I ; p
R
E)
@pE
+ qE(p
R
I ;E p
R)
A linear per-unit access charge cannot implement the social planner's preferred out-
come. The intuition is analogous to the multiproduct monopolist's. One variable is not
sucient to solve two equations. That is to say, a per-unit access price alone does not
allow for a socially optimal solution. It has to be accompanied by additional instruments,
such as taxes or subsidies.
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Corollary 2.2. Suppose a benevolent social planner wants to implement marginal cost
retail pricing or Ramsey prices. Then employing a linear per-unit access price a is not
sucient.
For cost-based access pricing and a multiproduct monopolist's solution we had @A(pI ;pE)@pI >
0 and @A(pI ;pE)@p2 < 0. To implement the socially optimal solution, the sign of both deriva-
tives is ambiguous. However if we assume cT to be close to zero14 we can conclude that
there occurs a sign change for both derivatives of the social planner's access payment
solution as compared to the case of the integrated monopolist.
2.3.5 Evaluation of Access Payments
By appropriately specifying the access payment function, every pricing equilibrium is im-
plementable as an outcome of a Bertrand game between the two players. The mechanism
replicates slope and level conditions of any equilibrium by matching the rst-order condi-
tions. We showed that this can be done by a fairly simple three-part tari of the form
A(pI ; pE) = T + a1 pI + a2 pE : (2.22)
Because it uses three instruments15 it is superior to using a simple per-unit access charge16.
In this section, we restrict myself to access payment functions of the form (2.22), since
they exhibit all desirable properties, that allow us to implement the discussed equilibria.
Graphically, the properties of such a mechanism can be depicted by the rms' best response
functions. By choosing a1 and a2 of (2.22), we do implement a particular point in fpI ; pEg-
space by matching slope and level conditions. This is easy to see once we have a look at
gure 2.3.
Consider the reference point (pI ; p

E). This is the equilibrium outcome with Bill and
Keep, i.e. A(pI ; pE) = 0. Choosing a1 and a2 in (2.22) appropriately implements any point
(pI ; pE) 2 R2+. This follows immediately from the rms' rst-order conditions. Applying
(2.22) to (2.5) and (2.6), we obtain
14Note that this is a sucient condition for uniqueness and existence of an equilibrium.
15Note that the transfer T ensures distributional eciency.
16However it has to be noted, that a per-unit access charge in combination with an output tax does the
job as well.
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pI
pE
BRE
BRI
a1 > 0, a2 < 0
a1 > 0, a2 > 0a1 < 0, a2 > 0
a1 < 0, a2 < 0
Figure 2.3: Dierent Regions of equilibria
(pI   cT   cSI )
@qI(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ qI(pI ; pE)  cT @qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ a1 = 0 (2.23)
(pE   cSE)
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pE
+ qE(pI ; pE)  a2 = 0
Because the mechanism in (2.22) yields
@2A(pi; pE)
@pi@pj
= 0
for all i; j = I; E, a1 and a2 shift the rst-order conditions. The slopes of the best response
functions in (2.23) and (2.24) remain constant, hence the best response curves are only
shifted.
This is depicted in gure 2.3. BRI (BRE) is I's (E's) best response curve, whenever
a1 = 0 (a2 = 0). If a1 < 0, I's best response is shifted to the left, for a1 > 0, it is shifted to
the right. Analogous for a2 > 0 BRE is shifted down and for a2 < 0 up. It is certainly clear
that by picking a1 and a2 appropriately, any point in fpI ; pEg-space can be implemented.
Furthermore, by choosing the constant T in (2.22), prots can be redistributed among the
rms.
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@pI
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E )
( ) (+)
Table 2.1: Coecients a1 and a2 and their respective signs
With gross substitutes, rms' best response curves are upward sloping. Using the
asymmetric bill & keep equilibrium as a reference point, we can conclude, that a negative
a1 and a positive a2 shift I and E's best response curves such that prices are smaller than
the reference prices.
If prices are indicators for overall welfare, the claim is that a welfare ranking can be
made by using the coecients a1 and a2.
To further embark on this, let us have a look at table 2.1. It summarizes the results
obtained so far, by listing the coecients of all access pricing rules considered in the paper.
Two polar cases can be identied, namely the integrated monopolist's and the social
planner's solution. The integrated monopolist is able to extract full surplus in the market
and his prices are highest. The social planner xes prices at marginal cost of production,
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hence there is no mark up involved.
In table 2.1 we see that a monopolist chooses a1 > 0 and a2 < 0. Hence he shifts out
both best response functions as compared to bill & keep, resulting in higher equilibrium
prices. Inspecting the social planner's choice of parameters, we realize that for cT small
17,
a1 < 0 and a2 > 0. With I and E's service being gross substitutes, the parameters
for the cost based access price satisfy a1 > 0 and a2 < 0. The signs of the parameters
implementing the Ramsey outcome are characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. In order to implement the Ramsey equilibrium by means of an access pay-
ment function of the form
A(pi; pE) = T + a1pI + a2pE
the signs of the parameters have to fulll a1 < 0 and a2 > 0 for cT close to zero.
Proof: see appendix.
The result is summarized by proposition 2.2:
Proposition 2.2. For cT close to zero, the signs of the derivatives
A(pi;pj)
@pi
, i 2 fI; Eg
pairwise indicate the desirability with respect to welfare. The combination A(pI ;pE)@pI < 0
and A(pI ;pE)@pE > 0 unambiguously indicates a welfare superior outcome as compared to
A(pI ;pE)
@pI
> 0 and A(pI ;pE)@pE < 0.
Proposition 2.2 gives a simple yet clear cut rule to evaluate interconnection settlements.
If rms are obliged to express there interconnection agreement as a function of retail
prices in the end market, the regulatory authority is able to conclude from the signs of
the agreement, whether the agreement is socially desirable or subject to collusion.
We argue that this is a preliminary test. There are several reasons for that. First of
all, whenever the derivatives of the access payment function exhibit the same sign, i.e.
both positive or both negative, the conclusion is generally ambiguous. In other words,
negative parameter for the incumbent's price is desirable for it punishes his market power.
However if the coecient on the entrant's price is negative as well, the entrant might in
a favorable position, since his best response curve is shifted outwards, hence both prices
17In line with our assumptions on network markets.
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increase18. In these cases the overall eect of the access payment is not revealed by the
mechanism, but depends on demand as well as cost information.
However even when the coecients are of the same sign, a regulatory authority has
a rst indication, where the problem of the access mechanism is hidden. In the case just
described, it is a good idea, to look at the strategic positioning of the entrant. Hence by
using the mechanism on retail prices as a very early indicator, underlying problems can
be identied very early, hence further investigation might be easier.
Also note that the magnitude of the reported numbers does not have a meaning without
information on cost and demand. Hence low numbers are not generally desirable, as well
as high parameter values are not associated with socially undesirable results.
2.3.6 Bill & Keep revisited
Table 2.1 not only indicates a welfare ordering but also gives arguments in favor of Bill &
Keep. The following proposition makes the point
Proposition 2.3. Bill & Keep is welfare superior to regulating access at marginal cost
for substitutable services.
To prove this point, consider the simple model with a per-unit access charge, i.e. rms'
prot functions are
I = (pI   cS   cT ) qI(pI ; pE) + (a  c) qE(pI ; pE)
E = (pE   cS   a) qE(pI ; pE)
Given an access charge a, I and E's optimal prices are determined by the rst-order
conditions
(pI   cS   cT ) @qI(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ q(pI ; pE) + (a  c) @qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
= 0
(pE   cS   a) @qE(pI ; pE)
@pE
+ qE(pI ; pE) = 0
18Notice that it is still important to look at the entrant's retail price. If the entrant's market segment is
highly competitive, his retail price is close to marginal cost. In this case, the entrant is rewarded by the
mechanism.
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Since optimal retail prices solve these rst-order conditions they are also an implicit func-
tion of the access charge. Hence applying the implicit function theorem to both equations
yields pI 's and pE 's reactivity with respect to a.
dpI
da
=
 @qE(pI ;pE)@pI
(pI   cS   cT ) @2qI(pI ;pE)@p2I +
@q(pI ;pE)
@pI
+ (a  c) @2qE(pI ;pE)
@p2I
(2.24)
dpE
da
=
@qE(pI ;pE)
@pE
(pE   cS   a) @2qE(pI ;pE)@p2E + qE(pI ; pE)
(2.25)
Note that in (2.24) as well as in (2.25), the denominator has to be negative if optimality
is satised and because services are substitutable, both derivatives are indeed positive.
Hence decreasing the access charge decreases both retail prices. 
The intuition of proposition 2.3 is straightforward. By decreasing a, E's perceived
marginal cost is reduced, which puts him into a competitive advantage. Therefore he is
able to reduce his equilibrium price. This is oset by an increase of the amount of service
provided in equilibrium.
The more interesting case is I's decrease in retail price due to a decrease in access
charge. Due to the substitutability of services, increasing pI increases E's output. Because
I provides network service to E, this has a direct eect on I's prot. Decreasing a increases
the competitive pressure on I and decreases pI . Since (a   cT ), the per unit access
prot (decit) becomes smaller, increasing E's output through increasing pI becomes
more harmful in terms of I's prot. Hence I has an incentive to decrease pI whenever a
is reduced.
If prices are a perfect indicator for overall welfare19, we can unambiguously say that
bill & keep is welfare superior to regulating access prices exactly at cost in the upstream
market20.
Bill & Keep as an ecient interconnection agreement has already been discussed in
the literature related to the analysis of two-way access models. Degraba (2000)21 argues,
that Bill & Keep at the central oce (COBAK), reduces networks' incentives to free ride
on the other network.
19Which is true if we assume away income eects in the social welfare function.
20We assume that joint prots with Bill & Keep are positive, hence cost are covered
21For a discussion of the COBAK see Wright (2002) and Degraba (2002)
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In a one-way interconnection world, bill & keep, i.e. exchanging trac without pay-
ment, is not rational at all. It leaves all entrants with the opportunity to free ride on the
incumbent's sunk investment and hence it annihilates all of the incumbent's incentive to
invest in enhancing his network.
It has been widely argued that, especially in telecommunications networks, usage based
cost are negligible. The bulk of cost is sunk in the beginning. Assuming a marginal cost
of transmission of zero, any per-unit access charge distorts market prices. In order to
compensate the incumbent for network usage, xed fee should be charged.
There are two arguments in favor of this change in policy. Firstly, interconnection
practice evolves in line with retail prices. The past years have seen a rapid change in
dierent network services to simple and easy at taris. Only recently the German mobile
provider E-Plus launched a service called BASE, where customers only paid a monthly
at fee instead of usage based prices.
Secondly, it reduces accounting cost on both sides, the regulator's as well as on the
rms' side. Although cost data is still required to calculate the transfer from entrants to
the incumbent. However these cost do not have to be allocated to a (possibly incorrect)
estimate of demand. Using a usage independent tari avoids some of the accounting cost,
that make interconnection regulation so dicult.
2.4 Conclusion
The paper proposed a model of one-way interconnection, where both rms, the entrant
and the incumbent, exhibit market power in the downstream market. Hence an access
payment function based on a per-unit access charge is nothing but a mechanism based on
end service prices.
By simply accounting rst-order conditions we were able to reproduce results of specic
access pricing rules as well as general results such as the social planners optimal retail prices
or the Ramsey result by implementing an access mechanism based on retail prices.
This is due to the well known fact that the more instruments the regulator disposes of,
the larger the set of possibly implementable outcomes. Armstrong (2005) recognizes the
fact that using an access charge and an output tax, the social planner's preferred solution
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can be implemented.
By using a simple three part tari we showed that for marginal cost of access close
to zero, the derivatives with respect to the competitors prices pairwise suggest a welfare
ordering. Whenever the parameter on the incumbent's price is negative and the parameter
on the entrant's price is positive, prices are lower as compare to the bill & keep benchmark.
This is true because both best response curves are shifted inwards, hence decreasing prices
whenever services are perfect substitutes. The revers is true whenever the parameter on
the incumbent's price is positive and that on the entrant's price is negative.
A similar reasoning shows that bill & keep is more ecient in terms of lower prices
than an industry with access prices regulated at cost.
On a normative level the paper makes the point that using per-unit access charges as
the single most important policy instrument seems to be unnecessarily restrictive. At rst
sight, using a per-unit access charge immediately links cost to prices, which is an a priori
desirable property.
In the present model with market power on the entrant's as well as on the incumbent's
side, pricing access at cost does not take care of all distortions in the market. The results
of the paper show, that simple rules such as bill & keep can lead to desirable results and
suggested a very simple test for regulators to judge a proposed access pricing mechanism.
Instead of using ever more technically involved methods of measuring costs in an in-
dustry, which are terribly hard to dene at rst and even harder to gather information
of, regulatory policies should concentrate on applicability. Hence using mechanisms that
require as little information as possible seems more attractive than using exact and so-
phisticated methods on \dirty" numbers.
The fact that litigations and debates on interconnection practices increased over the
last decades, also indicates a growing need of simple rules that can be applied easily.
The World Bank and the ITU termed the quest for \the" interconnection policy as the
single most important problem a regulator is faced with. This is especially true with the
liberalization of other network industries such as the railway network, the postal monopoly
and the energy sector. Interconnection is very likely to play a big role in the regulator's
policy making. Hence his toolkit should be widened rather than restricted by a single
instrument.
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2.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The idea of the proof is straightforward. In what follows we
show that the game is supermodular given the restrictions on A(pI ; pE) in prop0sition
2.1. Using a theorem by Topkis, where he shows that every supermodular game has a
nonempty equilibrium set, the proposition is proved.
The denition of a supermodularity is given by:
The game (Ai;I ; i 2 N) is (strictly) supermodular if for each i, Ai is a compact
lattice, i is upper- semicontinuous and supermodular in ai for xed a i and displays
(strictly) increasing dierences in (ai; a i).
The game (Ai;I ; i 2 N) is smooth supermodular if each Ai is a compact cube in
Euclidian space, i is twice continuously dierentiable, and
@2I
@aih@aik
 0 for all k 6= h
and @
2I
@aih@ajk
 0 for all j 6= i and for all h and k. Strict inequalities for the second set
of derivatives will yield strictly increasing dierences in (ai; a i) and a smooth strictly
supermodular game.22
In essence these denitions say that whenever two goods in a market are complementary
in prices, that is they are substitutable and the eects increase the higher prices are, .
Most fortunate there exists a theorem by Topkis, that ensures the existence of nonempty
equilibrium set for supermodular games.
Lemma A.2.1. In a supermodular game the equilibrium set E is non-empty and has a
largest, a = supfa 2 A : 	(a)  ag, and a smallest a = inffa 2 A : 	(a)  ag, element.23
It remains to be shown that the game at hand is indeed supermodular:
i) The rst condition is on the strategy space Ai. Notice that each players strategy
is to pick a price pi 2 [0;1], which indeed satises the restrictions of denition 2,
where all Ai have to be compact cubes in Euclidean space.
22The denitions are taken from Vives (1999), page 36
23Again the denition is taken from Vives (1999), page 36. The proof can be found there as well
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ii) The prot functions in (2.3) and (2.4) are indeed twice dierentiable, which satises
the second constraint of denition 2.
iii) The third restriction is on the second derivatives of our prot functions. Formally
it can be written as
@2I
@pI@pE
 0 @
2E
@pI@pE
 0 (A.2.1)
If we apply the condition to (2.3) and (2.4), we can rewrite (A.2.1) as
(pI   cT   cS)@
2qI(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
+
@qI(pI ; pE)
@pE
  cT @
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
+
@2A(pI ; pE)
@pI@pE
 0
(pE   cS)@
2qE(pI ; pE)
@pE@pI
+
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
  @
2A(pI ; pE)
@pE@pI
 0
Rearranging yields the conditions (2.7) and (2.8).
Proof of lemma 2.4. The claim is
 

(pRI   cT   cS)
@qI(p
R
I ; p
R
E)
@pI
+ qI(p
R
I ; p
R
E)  cT
@qE(p
R
I ; p
R
E)
@pI

< 0
(pRE   cS)
@qE(p
R
I ; p
R
E)
@pE
+ qE(p
R
I ;E p
R) > 0
Fix cT = 0. Implicitly this means
pI(p
R) > pR and pE(p
R) > pR
where pi (pR) denotes i's best response function dened by (2.10) and (2.11). Due to
symmetry, pRI = p
R
E = p
R and pDI = p
D
E = p
D, also note, that the duopoly is unique.
Suppose that pI(p
R) = pR. This means that pI(pE) crosses the 45 degree line at
pE = p
R. Since the duopoly equilibrium is symmetric, both best response functions have
to intersect at pI = pE = p
D. I and E's services are gross services, so pI(pE) is increasing
EVALUATING INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS 34
for pE  0. Because of Katakuni's xed point theorem, pI(pE) can intersect the 45 degree
line only once, thus pR = pD. This is a contradiction, because by assumption the market
is viable, hence pD > pR.
Suppose that pI(p
R) < pR. Note that stability requires
@pI
@pE
< 1, hence pI( pE) < pE
for all pE > p
D. This implies pR > pD if pI(p
R) < pR. Thus, at pD, rms make losses,
also a contradiction.
This proves the claim for cT = 0. In order to complete the prove of lemma 2.4. Now
increase cT by . By continuity, we can nd an  small enough, for which the above claim
holds.
Chapter 3
An Interconnection Agreement
based on Retail Prices
3.1 Introduction
The growth of the Internet has made bandwidth and network capacity one of today's most
sought after inputs. Without physical access to broadband networks, companies such as
Youtube.com, Ebay.com and Google would not be possible. Similarly, rms like Skype
buy network capacity to provide \old fashioned" voice services by using new technologies
like Voice over IP (VoIP).
Despite the tremendous eort that has been undertaken in the nineties to liberalize
telecommunications markets, facilities-based competition is still far from being imple-
mented in most countries of the world. The former monopolists still enjoy market power
by owning a signicant bottleneck. In order to ensure access to the incumbent's network
regulatory authorities still watch over the market for interconnection. The same is true
for the utilities, railway and postal service industry.
More generally, the optimal regulation of a vertically integrated incumbent selling net-
work access as an essential input to his competitors is still one of the most important issues
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in regulatory policy1. The answers proposed by economic literature2 share the common
assumption of a per-unit access charge. The Ecient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)
derives the interconnection charge from the incumbent's opportunity cost of providing ac-
cess. The optimal Ramsey access charges are dependent on the demand structure and the
physical cost of providing access. All approaches require detailed cost information and a
sound knowledge of the underlying demand parameters, which is hardly accessible.
In this paper we take a new road to interconnection pricing, which we call \Parapric-
ing". We employ a model of one-way interconnection, where an incumbent and an entrant
produce two dierentiated services. These services use a physical network owned by the
incumbent as an input. Because products are dierentiated, an access payment based on a
per-unit charge is a function of both rms' retail prices. Conditioning the access payment
on two retail prices allows for an additional instrument as compared to a single per-unit
access price.
With Parapricing, the regulator uses this additional instrument and introduces a game
between an incumbent and an entrant. In a rst stage, each rm simultaneously chooses
one of two distinct parameters of a linear access contract based on the both rms' retail
prices. In particular the incumbent determines the weight on the entrant's retail price and
the entrant the weight of the incumbent's price. In the second stage, rms choose their
retail prices given the parameters of the access payment function.
This approach has two remarkable informational benets. Firstly, it diminishes the
role of the regulator and subsequently reduces the amount of information needed. With
Parapricing, the regulator neither picks retail nor access prices, as is the case with most
proposals in interconnection pricing. He rather acts as a supervisor that oversees the rules
of the game.
Secondly, it shifts responsibility to the entrant. He is actively engaged in the inter-
connection pricing process. Hence decision rights are shifted to the player who actually
disposes of information needed for setting prices, i.e. cost and demand information.
1Although the adjacency to network industries is apparent, the model can be employed to traditional
industries as well. We may think of a producer of tower cranes who rents his cranes to construction rms
and at the same time sells his products to competitors who also rent cranes.
2See Armstrong (2002b) and Laont and Tirole (2000) for extensive surveys
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After introducing Parapricing and stating its rules, we show in a simple model with
linear demands, that there exists a unique equilibrium in prices and regulatory parameters.
In equilibrium prices are lower and welfare is higher as compared to pure cost-based access
pricing. This is especially appealing to markets with dierentiated products, since in this
setting, retail prices are not only distorted via the access market, but also due to imperfect
competition downstream. Furthermore, we derive conditions for which Parapricing yields
the same results as the Ramsey program.
The analysis of the paper suggests that Parapricing's decision structure creates a trade
o between increasing/decreasing prots directly via the access parameter and indirectly
via resulting changes in retail prices. As compared to regulating access at marginal cost,
the incumbent has an incentive to increase its access revenues, thereby by decreasing both
retail prices. The entrant on the other hand wants to decrease his access payment and
thereby decreases both retail prices. This yields overall lower prices as in the case of
symmetric duopoly, i.e. cost based access pricing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the results and assumptions
of the literature on per-unit access charges. Section 4.2 introduces the model and the
regulatory framework. The equilibrium is derived in section 3.4. Section 3.5 compares the
results to important benchmarks. The general framework and strengths and weaknesses
in terms of applicability are discussed in section 3.6. Section 4.5 concludes.
3.2 What, why and how to regulate?
Ocially telecommunications markets in most industrialized countries have been \fully
liberalized"3 in the mid nineties. Eectively former state owned monopolists are still
subject to regulatory laws. In most countries the incumbent is the sole proprietary of
a physical network, which is an essential input for the entrants' services. Hence the
incumbent has a natural monopoly in the upstream market. This raises concern that the
incumbent exercises his market power in order to exclude entrants or gain supranormal
3The European Commission states that \Since 1 January 1998, the telecommunications markets are
fully liberalised in most of the European Union." (European Commission (1999)). Cite FCC Telecom-
munciations Act 1996.
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prots. Therefore markets for interconnection are regulated.
Laws like the Directive 97/33 of the European Commission provide National Regula-
tory Authorities (NRA) and market agents with a framework within which interconnection
settlements are to be reached. Amongst other things, it states procedures how to dene a
relevant market 4, dispute settlement processes and cost accounting procedures.
The access payment mechanism as such is never dened explicitly. For instance the
FCC states in its FCC Telecommunications Act 1996 (Part II, Section 251):
\The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommu-
nications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network on rates,
terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in accor-
dance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this
section and section 252."
Nothing is said about either the structure or the quantitative measure of interconnection
agreements. They only have to be \just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory".
The EU encouraged its member states to transfer the responsibility of nding an
interconnection mechanism to the rms. If they fail, every NRA has to implement dispute
settlement procedures in order to reach mutual consent among parties. This requires active
guidance by regulators to nd an optimal access payment mechanism which is borne by
rms and their customers.
An optimal access payment mechanism has to achieve at least two goals at the same
time: on the one hand it has to increase competition by inducing (ecient) entry. On the
other hand the network proprietary has to be provided with enough incentives to invest
in infrastructure. The ultimate goal is to guarantee a sucient (maximal) level of welfare
to consumers and producers alike.
As long as market characteristics such as demand and cost structure are known to
the regulator, this is an optimization problem, which is solvable | at least numerically.
Unfortunately, the regulator does not dispose of the required information. He has little
knowledge, if any, about cost and demand structures in the relevant industries. Mostly
rms even have incentives to hide their cost structure.
4A description of the market denition process and an extensive discussion can be found in Gual (2003).
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Hence the optimal regulatory strategy has to be found in the absence of information
of the regulatory authority. In that sense economic theory should always be concerned
with a high degree of practicability, since obtaining information about rms, consumers
and markets in general is timely and costly to gather.
Let us have a look at the solutions suggested by the literature on interconnection to
solve the regulator's problem. Among the rst to address the question were Willig (1979)
and Baumol (1983). They introduced the notion of an access charge, i.e. a per-unit price
paid by the entrant in order to use the incumbent's facilities.
Most of the earlier papers assumed perfect competition in the downstream market.
Hence, it suces to identify the marginal cost of providing access, because that determines
the optimal access price. Simply setting the price equal to marginal cost ensures the
socially optimal outcome in the market.
However due to the inherent xed costs, that are associated with setting up and running
a fully edged network, the literature adopted broader notions of costs. Baumol and Sidak
(1994) and Laont and Tirole (2000) distinguish between marginal, incremental, average
incremental cost, cost in the long-run or the short-run.
One thing, all of the cost denitions have in common is that they are hard to measure
for any regulatory authority. Accurate information about average incremental cost or
marginal cost can only be provided by network owners themselves. When it comes to cost
forecasts, even rms may fail to provide correct numbers.
Incentive regulation always has to deal with inherent asymmetric information5. Regu-
latory laws on interconnection include detailed cost accounting procedures to circumvent
this problem. However because the incumbent has strong incentive to exaggerate his cost,
eort is undertaken to report favorable gures to the NRAs6. Hence cost information the
regulator disposes of is at best questionable, as is its application to access price regulation.
These are direct cost measures, that determine the access price in a \quid pro quo"
5The classic citation for incentive regulation is certainly Laont and Tirole (1993) who discuss the
literature extensively.
6Incentive regulation proposes mechanisms that deal with this asymmetry in particular. These bring
together incentives to truthfully report cost parameters as well as to increase eciency of production.
The reader is referred to Laont and Tirole (1993) and the discussions on price cap and rate of return
regulation.
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manner. A second class of access charge rules are often referred to as usage-based (Laont
and Tirole (1996)). One of them, the ECPR, uses the opportunity cost of the incumbent
due to the entry of another rm into its market. Armstrong (2002b) denes the ECPR as
access charge = cost of providing access
+ incumbent0s lost profit in retail markets
caused by providing access:
The ECPR permits only ecient entry, i.e. by rms operating at a lower cost than the
incumbent7. Despite its intuitive appeal and the beauty of simplicity, several objections
have been brought forward. Economides and White (1995) point out that the eciency
of the ECPR is only given at a very specic set of assumptions. One of them is the
assumption that the pricing of the monopolist reects marginal costs. They show that as
soon as the monopolist exercises market power, the ECPR eventually protects supranormal
prots. Ergas and Ralph (1994) highlight the fact that from a cost of regulation point of
view nothing is gained as compared to cost-based pricing. They adopt the view that the
ECPR is as costly as the Ramsey pricing in terms of information. The application of the
ECPR requires explicit knowledge of the demand and cost structure in the market.
In two seminal papers, Laont and Tirole (1994) and Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers
(1996) relax the assumption of perfect competition in the downstream market. They
employ a model with an incumbent exhibiting market power and a competitive fringe and
derive expressions for the optimal Ramsey access charge. Ramsey access charges exhibit
a mark-up on marginal cost because of the inherent xed cost in the industries. They are
also usage-based, hence optimal prices are determined by the elasticities of the demand
functions and the marginal cost of providing access. Therefore implementing Ramsey
prices requires detailed knowledge of demand and cost parameters as is the case with
ECPR.
A way to overcome these informational barriers are global price caps8. The idea is
7Numerical examples are provided by Ergas and Ralph (1994)) as well as Economides and White (1995)
8Global and partial price caps are treated extensively in Laont and Tirole (1996), Laont and Tirole
(1994) and Vogelsang (2003)
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straightforward: instead of xing prices at a particular value, the portfolio of prices,
including the access charge, is restricted in terms of its relative structure and its overall
level. It can be shown, that choosing appropriate weights for a global price cap results
in rms choosing optimal Ramsey prices. These weights turn out to be output levels
produced at Ramsey prices. Note that with this approach, neither elasticities nor cost
information is needed. However, weights have to be correctly anticipated. In practice9,
past output levels are used.
Although the latter approach reduces the amount of information considerably, the
regulator is still intervening actively in rms' pricing decision. As is the case with all
proposals discussed above, this requires information that is hardly accessible. Additionally,
market parameters such as elasticities have to be computed as accurately as possible. This
is both time and money consuming, sometimes even impossible. Finally dening accurate
notions of cost or markets, may turn out dicult in rapidly evolving markets such as
telecommunications markets. This questions the applicability of traditional per-unit access
charge rules.
With Parapricing we take this fundamental scarcity of available information into ac-
count.10 The regulator only determines the rules of the regulatory game played by the
rms. It is a mechanism based on both retail prices, that of the incumbent and the entrant.
Within the framework, rms are free to determine prices and the access parameters.
3.3 The Model
In this section we specify the model, that underlies the remainder of the paper. The
incumbent I is the sole proprietary of a physical network11. To produce service in the
downstream market, both I and an entrant E use network capacity as an essential input.
9For a discussion on practical issues and experience see Laont and Tirole (1996) and Crew and Klein-
dorfer (1996)
10To our knowledge Jeon and Hurkens (forthcoming) is the only paper accounting for this lack of infor-
mation by designing an appropriate mechanism. Laont and Tirole (1994) use an asymmetric information
approach, however the regulator still has to dispose of information on the cost distribution.
11The model derived with the telecommunications industry in mind, where the essential facility is a
ber/copper/mobile network. Notice however, that this could be any technology physical or not, that
happens to have analogous market characteristics
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A unit of network capacity is required to produce a unit of the nal product. Entry is not
facility based, hence the entrant will not duplicate the entire network, because the xed
cost is prohibitively high.
 Demand structure: An incumbent and an entrant compete in a downstream
service market oering imperfect substitutes. To make the model tractable we assume
linear demand functions of the form
qi(pi; pj) = 1  pi + pj 8 i 2 fI; Eg i 6= j (3.1)
where  2]0; 1[. Note that the derivatives satisfy @qi(pi;pj)@pi < 0,
@qi(pi;pj)
@pj
> 0,
@2qi(pi;pj)
@pi2
 0
and
@2qi(pi;pj)
@pi@pj
 0 for all i 2 fI; Eg. Hence products are substitutes and prices strategic
complements12.
We do not model demand as a subscription demand, as for example de Bijl and Peitz
(2004) do. Consumers do not decide whether to be part of a network, but how much of
the product to buy. We strongly believe that this is justied in \new" types of content
networks markets, as well as data networks.
 Cost structure: Overall cost is determined by production in upstream and down-
stream markets. For the transmission of one unit of data, or more generally for one unit
of network usage, I incurs a constant marginal cost of cT .
In the downstream market, I and E incur a constant marginal cost cS for producing
one unit of service. In traditional telecommunications markets it is often referred to as
the cost of switching, i.e. the cost a rm has to incur at a central or regional switch for
completing a connection of two agents. Naturally, cS could dier across rms.
Furthermore we assume that every unit of nal service requires exactly one unit of
network good and one unit of switching. Hence, the actual cost of providing one unit
service to customers amounts to cS + cT . For simplicity and ease of presentation we
assume cS + cT = 2c for the rest of the paper.
12Demand functions are derived from the maximization of a net-utility function given by
U(qI ; qE) =   1
2(1  2) (q
2
I + q
2
E)  
(1  2)qIqE +
1
1   (qI + qE)  pIqI   pEqE
which is quadratic and strictly concave given the restriction on .
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Scenario I E Regulator
A a1, a2 | |
B | a1, a2 |
C a1 a2 |
D | | a1, a2
E a2 a1 |
Table 3.1: Possible decision structures
In addition to the variable cost, both rms incur a xed cost of FI and FE .
 Regulatory setting: Parapricing takes the regulator's lack of information ex-
plicitly into account. This is not in the sense of incomplete information, but rather as a
complete lack of information of either rms' cost or consumers' demand. In the absence
of eective regulation, the incumbent tries to maximize prots and skim o all the prots
that can be realized in the downstream market. The regulator has to specify an envi-
ronment where entry is possible and rms compete eectively. Ideally, this framework is
as general and easily veriable as possible. As discussed above, if downstream services
are dierentiated, the access charge payment function is a special case of a general access
payment function based on I and E's retail prices. The access payment mechanism used
in this paper is a general function of retail prices given by
A(pI ; pE) = T + a1pI + a2pE : (3.2)
The access payment function consists of ve dierent variables that have to be decided
upon. We want rms to set their own prices, that is I picks pI and E picks pE . Leaving
aside the parameter T for the moment13, a1 and a2 have to be allocated to either the
rms or the regulator as a decision variable. Table 3.1 summarizes ve possible decision
structures for the parameters of the linear access payment function.
13We will turn to that in section 3.6
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In scenario A and B, either I or E decide upon the parameters of the regulatory game.
The advantage is that the regulator does not have to intervene in the market. Hence he
does not have to dispose of any market information.
However if the incumbent sets both a1 and a2, he is able to extract joint industry
monopoly prots. If E decides on a1 and a2, it can be shown that there only exists
a cornered equilibrium. Therefore we can rule out scenarios A and B as a desirable
mechanism.
In scenario C, either rm decides upon its \own" parameter. From the point of view
of the regulator, it is desirable, since no information is needed. It is the sole responsibility
of both rms to determine the access payment contract. However in terms of lower prices
and enhanced competition, nothing is gained. To see that let us look at the rst-order
conditions of the pricing game.
(pI   2c)@qI(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ qI(pI ; pE)  c@qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ a1 = 0 (3.3)
(pE   c)@qE(pI ; pE)
@pE
+ qE(pI ; pE)  a2 = 0 (3.4)
From (3.3) and (3.4) it is apparent that if I determines a1 and E decides upon a2, both
rms are able to shift their best response functions outwards, resulting in higher end user
prices. This is reminiscent of the \raising each others cost" practice in the two-way access
pricing problem discussed in Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) and Armstrong (1998).
In scenario D of table 3.1, the regulatory authority chooses a1 and a2. Notice that there
is no substantial informational gain to Ramsey pricing with a per unit access charge14.
Both possibilities imply that the benevolent social planner has to have enough knowledge
on demand and cost parameters. In that sense, no mechanism is superior over the other.
Finally in scenario E I determines a2 and E chooses a1. Notice that through (3.3)
and (3.4), their choices have direct consequences on the retail pricing decision of their
competitor. Since the regulator does not determine any parameter of the access payment
function, this mechanism is certainly superior in terms of information.
By designing a game this way, we show that I (E) faces a trade o between increasing
14In chapter 2 of this monograph, it is shown that there is indeed a dierence between both scenarios.
With scenario D, the regulator is actually able to implement the social optimum where retail prices are
set to marginal cost. This result is due to the additional instrument. However if a per-unit access charge
is combined with an output tax, both approaches are equivalent.
AN INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT 45
I E Regulator
Retail pI  0 pE  0 |
Access a2  0 a1  0 T
Table 3.2: Parapricing's strategic variables
own prot through increased (decreased) access payment and decreasing retail prices. We
also show that, reducing retail prices results in a comparative disadvantage for I.
Furthermore, we assume that pI  0 and pE  0. It is shown in the appendix that
this avoids peculiar pricing schemes that could possibly occur. Intuitively for a1  0 it
is possible that I prefers to set a negative price in order make his compensation payment
positive. The same is true for E. With a2 > 0 setting pE < 0 lets E enjoy an access
transfer. Table 3.2 summarizes the strategic variables in the regulatory game and their
allocation.
To sum up, the regulation mechanism is modeled in two stages. First, I picks a2  0
and E sets a1  0 in order to determine (3.2). In a second stage, rms pick their non-
negative retail prices.
Notice that the role of the regulator reduces considerably as compared to the regulation
schemes discussed in section 3.2. It suces to set up the framework, i.e. the access payment
mechanism and to choose the entrants that are allowed to play the game15.
Having dened the strategic variables of each rm, we now turn to the analysis of the
rms' decision problem.
 Firms' problem: In line with the preceding section, the prot functions for I and
E are given by
I = (pI   c)qI(pI ; pE)  c(qI(pI ; pE + qE(pI ; pE)) + a1pI + a2pE   FI (3.5)
E = (pE   c)qE(pI ; pE)  a1pI   a2pE   FE (3.6)
This fully characterizes a two player game in two stages:
15The role of the regulator in choosing the entrant is discussed in section 3.6
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1. Firms choose the regulatory parameters a1 and a2, where I decides upon a2 and E
decides upon a1.
2. I and E determine pI and pE respectively.
The game is solved by backwards induction. The next section characterizes the equi-
librium outcome.
3.4 Equilibrium Analysis
Solving the game for a subgame perfect equilibrium leads to the rst result of the paper:
Proposition 3.1. Consider the two-stage game dened by (3.5) and (3.6) where qI(pI ; pE)
and qE(pI ; pE) are given by (3.1). In the rst stage rm I picks a2  0 and rm E picks
a1  0, In stage two retail prices pI  0 and pE  0 are determined by I and E respectively.
For marginal cost suciently low and close enough substitutes, the unique equilibrium
of this game is given by:
pI(a

1; a

2) =
1
2   +
c(4  )
4  2 +
2a1   a2
4  2 (3.7)
pE(a

1; a

2) =
1
2   +
c((2  ) + 2)
4  2 +
a1   2a2
4  2 (3.8)
where a1 and a2 are given by
a1 =
3c  2   22c  2   4c+ 4 + 8c
2 + 4   8 (3.9)
a2 =
 8c+ 52c  4 + 2 + 2
2 + 4   8 : (3.10)
Proof. See appendix.
Note that the pI(a

1; a

2) and p

E(a

1; a

2) are nite, nonzero and symmetric. To see this
evaluate the equilibrium prices at the equilibrium parameters a1 and a2.
To understand rms' strategic interaction when choosing the regulatory parameters,
we have to disentangle the eects of changes in the parameters with respect to retail prices
and overall prots. Computing the rst-order conditions of each rm with respect to its
regulatory parameter, we obtain
(pI   c)

@qI
@pI
@pI
@a2
+
@qI
@pE
@pE
@a2

+
@pI
@a2
qI(pI ; pE)
=  

a1
@pI
@a2
+ pE + a2
@pE
@a2
  c

@qE
@pI
@pI
@a2
+
@qE
@pE
@pE
@a2
+
@qI
@pI
@pI
@a2
+
@qI
@pE
@pE
@a2

(3.11)
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and
(pE   c)

@qE
@pI
@pI
@a1
+
@qE
@pE
@pE
@a1

+
@pE
@a1
qE(pI ; pE) = a1
@pI
@a1
+ pI + a2
@pE
@a1
(3.12)
Equations (3.11) and (3.12) characterize the optimality conditions for a1 and a2. At
the margin, each rm chooses its parameter such that a change in retail prot due to
changes in retail prices is oset by the change in access prot/loss.
Consider the entrant's choice of a1. Changing a1 has two eects on E's prot: (i)
directly via the parameter in the prot function and (ii) indirectly by changing equilibrium
prices. Because of (3.12) the direct marginal eect on E's prot is  pI16. Hence decreasing
a1 by an innitesimal amount increases his prot by exactly the price of one unit of service.
The indirect eect of changing a1, that changes rms' retail prices and demands, is
identied by dierentiating (3.7) and (3.8) with respect to a1:
@pI
@a1
=
2
4  2 (3.13)
@pE
@a1
=

4  2 (3.14)
@qI
@a1
=  2  
2
4  2 (3.15)
@qE
@a1
=

4  2 (3.16)
Because the access payment function is linear in both rms' retail prices, increasing
a1 shifts I's best response function in the pricing game outwards. Because of (3.3) and
(3.4) I's best response pI(pE) is increased for every pE ceteris paribus, i.e. the best re-
sponse function is shifted outwards. However changing a1 does not alter E's best response
function. Graphically this is depicted in gure 3.1.
Shifting I's best response curve implies that equilibrium prices have to evolve along E's
best response curve. This also determines the relative change of pI and pE with respect
to a1. For the case of linear demands, the slope of E's best response function is given by
dpE
dpI
=  
(pE   c) @2qE@pI@pE +
@qE
@pI
(pE   c)@2qE@p2E + 2
@qE
@pE
=

2
;
16Note that all prices are evaluated at their equilibrium value. Hence each price is essentially a function
of a1 and a2.
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which is less than one for  2]0; 1[. Increasing a1 makes I's service relatively more ex-
pensive than E's service. This is apparent from (3.13) and (3.14). The reverse is true for
a1 < 0. This makes I's service relatively cheaper as compared to E's service.
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Figure 3.1: Best response curves with dierent a1's
Because the products are imperfect substitutes, the eect on demand is generally
ambiguous. For the case of symmetric linear demands, (3.15) and (3.16) suggest, that
increasing a1 reduces I's and increases E's realized demand. Hence increasing a1 puts the
entrant in a relative competitive advantage. It makes I's service relatively more expensive,
which induces some buyers to "switch and others to stop buying all together. Overall,
increasing a1 decreases joint realized demand. In sum, decreasing (increasing) a1 decreases
(increases) pE and qE , hence decreases (increases) E's retail prot.
Now consider the access payment and x a1 = a2 = 0. In this case, the marginal
eect of changing a1 on E's access payment is simply  pI . By decreasing a1 below zero,
E exhibits access revenues, i.e. he puts his competitor in a better position by making his
product relatively cheaper but takes his access prot away through decreasing" his own
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payment. E's retail prot is decreased by the decrease in a1. In equilibrium, these eects
oset each other, so that the marginal loss of retail prot is oset by the access payment
received from the incumbent.
Now let us look at I's choice of a2. We identify direct and indirect eects and look
at their impact on I's retail and access prots. Suppose I increases a2 to a
0
2. In order to
illustrate the impact of this increase graphically, we isolate the direct eect in gure 3.2.
A is I's initial isoprot curve with a2 . Keeping retail prices constant, increasing a2
increases I's prot directly by (a02   a2)pE17. Because we only look at the direct eect,
neither I's nor E's best response curve have shifted, i.e. prices remain constant at pI and
pE in gure 3.2.
The direct eect increases I's prot but has no impact on prices. Hence I's new
isoprot curve A00 at a02 has to pass through pI and p

E . Because p

I is still optimal for I,
the slopes of A and A00 are both zero at pI . O the equilibrium, increasing a2 widens the
isoprot curve A00.
The incumbent's isoprot curve A0 illustrates the increase in prot due to the increase
in a2. Increasing p

E to p
0
E leaves I with the same prot as changing a2 to a
0
2. Increasing
E's price with pI xed gives I a relative competitive advantage and induces an increase
in I's demand. I is indierent between increasing pE to p
0
E with constant a2 and p

I and
a at payment of (a02   a2)pE with constant retail prices.
Changing a2 changes the shape of the isoprot curve but not the location of the pricing
equilibrium. Varying pE with a2 constant shifts the isoprot curve without changing its
shape.
Now consider the change in equilibrium prices due to a change in a2. This is the in-
direct eect in gure 3.3. Because downstream service are imperfect substitutes, the best
response function of either rm is upward sloping. By increasing a2, E's best response
function is shifted downwards (BRE to BR
0
E). Looking at (3.4) it is immediate, that an
increase in a2 does not change the slope of E's best response functions since it is indepen-
dent of a2. Hence a change in a2 changes only the location of E's best response curve in
(pI ; pE)-space. I's best response curve is independent of a2, hence remains unchanged.
Equilibrium prices decrease from pI and p

E to p

I and pE. I's nal prot level after
17In order to isolate the direct eect, (a02   a2)pE can be thought of as a constant at payment.
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pI
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pE’
pE*
pI*
Figure 3.2: Direct Eect
the change in a2 is indicated by AA
0.
Implicit in the isoprot curve A00 is the direct eect on I's prot, due to the change in
a2. This makes it hard to compare the new to the original equilibrium in terms of isoprot
curves.
The indirect eect is illustrated by the isoprot curves AA and AA0. Curve AA is the
analogue to A0 in gure 3.2, with I = I(pI ; p
0
E ; a2)
18.
Proposition 3.1 states, that in equilibrium, prices will be symmetric. Note that pI and
pE are the direct eects on rms' prots of a change in a1 and a2. In equilibrium these
have to be equal to the changes in prot due to the price changes, that arise because of
the variation in a1 and a2. In a symmetric equilibrium, these marginal eects on either
rm's prot are identical.
This is a particularity of the symmetric linear demand model. It is easy to verify
that the lack of second order eects of prices on demand implies equally sloped best
response curves. Furthermore this implies symmetric derivatives of prices with respect to
the parameters a1 and a2.
18Note again, that I(p

I ; p
0
E ; a2) = I(p

I ; p

E ; a2
0)
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Figure 3.3: Indirect Eect
3.5 Benchmarks and Extensions
Ultimately we want to compare Parapricing's performance to its alternatives, i.e. the
access charge regulated at marginal cost on the one hand and the optimal Ramsey outcome
on the other hand. This subsection puts our mechanism to the test. In case of cost based
regulation of per-unit access charges, the regulator knows the marginal cost of providing
access. The second benchmark is the Ramsey outcome. We compare the results to the
ones obtained in the previous section and derive orderings according to prices and welfare.
In order to be able to compute explicit solutions, we employ the linear demand frame-
work introduced in 4.2. The analysis is extended in that we allow for asymmetric linear
demand systems with captive buyers and dierent levels of substitutabilities.
3.5.1 Cost-based Regulation
With cost-based regulation, the regulator sets a per-unit access charge equal to cost. In
our model, A(pI ; pE) = a qE(pI ; pE) with a = c. Firms maximize prots by choosing
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optimal prices. It is easy to see that these are given by
paI (c) = p
a
E(c) =
1 + 2c
2   (3.17)
Using the equilibrium prices and the utility function for the linear case we can state
the following proposition
Proposition 3.2. Equilibrium prices under Parapricing are lower and welfare is higher
than under a regulated per unit access price at exactly the marginal cost of providing access.
Proof. See appendix
By using an already (perfectly) regulated per unit access price we put a harsh informa-
tional restriction on the regulator. In reality, the regulator is hardly ever able to compute
the marginal cost of providing access that accurate.
On the other side Parapricing leaves all relevant decisions to the rms. The only task
remaining for the regulator is to make the rms play the game and compute the parameters
a1 and a2 independently and non-cooperatively.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. In order to see this, consider again the
rst-order conditions in (3.3) and (3.4):
FOCa1I = (pI   2c)
@qI(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ qI(pI ; pE)  c@qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ a1
FOCa2E = (pE   c)
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pE
+ qE(pI ; pE)  a2
Let us compare these to the rst-order conditions that result from the per-unit access
fee model. Using the linear demand functions in (3.1), dierentiating symmetric duopoly
prots with in pI and pE yields
FOCa=cI = (pI   2c)
@qI(pI ; pE)
@pI
+ qI(pI ; pE) (3.18)
FOCaE = (pE   c)
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pE
+ qE(pI ; pE) (3.19)
Let us dene the dierences of the rst-order conditions as
I = FOC
a=c
I   FOCa1I = c
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pI
  a1
E = FOC
a=c
E   FOCa2E =  c
@qE(pI ; pE)
@pE
+ a2
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Notice that @qE(pI ;pE)@pI > 0 as well as
@qE(pI ;pE)
@pE
< 0. In equilibrium a1  0 and a2  0.
For c  0, we have I > 0 and E > 0. Figure 3.4 illustrates the result qualitatively19.
Consider the curve BRa=cI 2. This is I's best response curve if a = c, the Bertrand duopoly.
BR
a1=a1
I depicts I's best response curve for Parapricing. Because I(a = c; a1 = a

1) > 0,
the best response curve is shifted to the left.
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Figure 3.4: Changes in First order conditions
Hence under Parapricing retail prices necessarily have to be smaller than with (positive)
per-unit charge.
3.5.2 Ramsey Pricing
It has been widely recognized that network industries involve high xed cost as compared
to the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the network good. It is for that
reason, that results have to compared to Ramsey prices instead of rst best marginal cost
19The assumption of symmetric linear demands puts restrictions on the shape of the best response curve.
In particular, they ensure linearity of best response curves and equal slopes for all cases.
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prices. This subsection compares equilibrium prices under Parapricing with the corre-
sponding Ramsey outcomes.
The representative consumer's utility function is maximized subject to the industry
break even condition. More formally for the case of the linear demand specication this is
maxpI ;pE   12(1 2)(q2I + q2E)  (1 2)qIqE + 11  (qI + qE)  pIqI   pEqE (3.20)
s:t:I +E = 0
The following lemma describes the solution to the Ramsey programm.
Lemma 3.1. There exist symmetric Ramsey prices fpRI ; pREg 2 R2+ whenever the following
condition is met:

1  2c(1  )
 2
2(1   )  FI + FE
pRI and p
R
E are both increasing in marginal cost c and the sum of the xed cost FI + FE.
Proof. See appendix.
The condition states, that Ramsey prices exist, whenever the multiproduct monopoly
prot is greater than the sum of industry xed cost. Given the existence of pRI and p
R
E we
are able to state the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that
pi (c^; ^; F^ )  pRi (c^; ^; F^ ) = 0
with F = FI + FE. Then
i. for all c = c^; F = F^ and  > ^ ) pi (c^; ; F^ )  pRi (c^; ; F^ ) > 0
ii. for all  = ^; F = F^ and c > c^ ) pi (c; ^; F^ )  pRi (c; ^; F^ ) < 0
iii. for all c = c^;  = ^ and F > F^ ) pi (c^; ^; F )  pRi (c^; ^; F ) < 0
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3.3 is a central nding of the paper. It states that there exists a set of
parameters, for which equilibrium prices under Parapricing are greater or equal to the
optimal Ramsey prices found in lemma 3.1. For marginal cost low enough, Ramsey prices
are smaller than Parapricing equilibrium prices. The higher the degree of substitutability,
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Figure 3.5: Prices
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Figure 3.6: Welfare
the more likely we end up in an equilibrium with pRi  pi . Lastly, whenever xed cost are
small enough, regulated equilibrium prices tend to be larger than Ramsey prices.
Together with the results of proposition 3.2 we are able to give an overall welfare
ordering of the all three scenarios considered in the paper. The result is summarized in
the proposition below.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that either c  c^ or   ^sigma or F  F^ , where c^, ^ and F^
are dened as in proposition 3.3. Then the following inequalities hold:
i. pRi  pi < pai (c) 8 i = I; E
ii. U
 
qE(p
R
I ; p
R
E); qI(p
R
I ; p
R
E)
  U qE(pI ; pE); qI(pI ; pE)
> U
 
qE(p
a
I (c); p
a
E(c)); qI(p
a
I (c); p
a
E(c))

Proof. See appendix.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate proposition 4.3 for variable degrees of product substi-
tutability . Note that c, FI and FE are chosen such that 
 is actually negative. Figure
3.5 plots the optimal Ramsey price pR and equilibrium prices p and pc under Parapricing
and cost-based access pricing respectively. For all  2]0; 1[, Parapricing yields lower prices
than cost -based access pricing.
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This translates immediately into gure 3.6, which illustrates the second part of propo-
sition 3.4. Consumer surplus is highest for Ramsey pricing. However Parapricing outper-
forms cost based pricing also in terms of welfare.
3.6 Discussion
Having stated the results, we want to discuss some of the assumptions of our model and
extend the analysis.
 Dierentiated Products: With the Internet gaining more and more importance
in today's business life, we believe that this is a necessary assumption to make. Not only
\old fashioned" voice services use network capacity, but also content driven networks have
to have access to physical networks in order to serve their customers.
Large and medium size enterprises buy network solutions. These can be LANs, com-
pany networks or simple telephone lines. In almost all cases, the contract between the
telecommunication provider and the customer includes a range of products together with
special agreements such as maintenance or customer service. In most countries these
services are provided by the network proprietary and large resellers20 of capacity. Dier-
entiation simply stems from side agreements or the oered bundle in itself.
Online services such as video on demand, life-streaming and news services are provided
by incumbents such as Deutsche Telekom in Germany. Original ISPs or competitors such
as Skype and Yahoo that provide similar services buy connectivity from Deutsche Telekom.
The dierentiating aspects between the rms' oers are clearly contentwise21. Dierent
providers specialize on dierent topics, so that a dierentiated demand approach seems to
be a good way to model the industry.
In general, network services, especially in the telecommunications industry, are being
20For example in Germany, T-Systems (a subsidiary of DTAG) and BT Ignite are direct competitors
in the market for large and medium sized business customers. BT leases network capacity from DTAG,
which and competes in the downstream market.
21Deutsche Telekom for example bought the rights to broadcast exclusively the Bundesliga, the rst
Division ins German Soccer, over the Internet. The UEFA broadcasts European Championsleague matches
over the Internet. It goes without saying that the UEFA does not own a physical network to transmit the
data.
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sold as bundles. Even in the market for private customers, the dierent bundles that
one could choose from are plentiful which satises the assumptions of dierentiated goods
environment.
 Linear demands: Since most of the analysis is carried out using a specic linear
demand schedule, the generality of the results is naturally very limited. However there
are several reasons for which we think the procedure is justied.
The nature of the problem requires a workaround in order to derive any results at all.
Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) and Laont and Tirole (1994) use a competitive
fringe model that makes the analysis easier. For reasons laid out above, we think a model
where both rms have market power is more appropriate.
The idea of shifting of the best response curves is a general result. It remains valid
with any kind of demand curve. In simulations with logit demands, the results of the
paper, in particular propositions 3.1 and 3.4 remain valid. This indicates a robustness of
the results obtained with the linear demands.
 Selection of entrant(s): In the present paper we restricted the analysis to a
market structure with one entrant and an incumbent. Two questions arise immediately:
how can rms commit to playing this game and what changes when there are several
entrants?
Let us start by comparing the equilibrium prots of I and E:
I(p

I(a

1; a

2); p

E(a

1; a

2))  PiE(pI(a1; a2); pE(a1; a2)) =  2c
This stems from the fact that
a1p

I + a

2p

E   cqE(pI(a1; a2); pE(a1; a2)) =  c:
From an incentive point of view, we are faced with the problem that I has to make the
necessary investments in the network, but the larger chunk of prots is made on E's
side. Hence making rms commit to playing the regulatory game amounts to making
the incumbent commit to playing the game. To circumvent this problem, we propose to
auction o a license, which allows a rm to be the entrant and play the game. Given
the appropriate auction design we expect rms to bid there expected prot, which is
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nothing but E(p

I(a

1; a

2); p

E(a

1; a

2)). The auction revenues are then redistributed to the
incumbent, such that the entrant hits his zero prot condition.
The mechanism is originally designed for two rms, of which one is the incumbent.
However the game can extended to n entrants. Using a mechanism of the rm
AI(pI ; p I) = (
nX
i
bi)pI +
nX
i
aipi (3.21)
Ai(pI ; pi) = bipI + aipi (3.22)
where i = 1::n, p I = (p1::pn), bi  0 and ai  0 for all i = 1::n. Simulations
for n=3 and linear demands suggest that the results obtained for a two player game
persist. Equilibrium prices for the mechanism in (3.21) and (3.22) are again lower than
those in a triopoly with access prices at marginal cost level. Notice that the mechanism
exhibits the same features as the mechanism with one entrant. By picking his parameters
the incumbent shifts the entrants' best response curves inwards, therefore lowering their
prices and boost his own prots. The reverse is true for the entrants. By setting their
parameters, they shift I's best response curve inwards and boost their own prots.
3.7 Conclusion
The present paper proposes a new approach to the regulation of interconnection. On
realizing that using a per-unit access charge is nothing but a contract on retail prices, we
employ a mechanism that takes this feature into account.
The mechanism puts both rms, the incumbent and the entrant into a game situation,
where they non-cooperatively determine the entrant's access payment. This is a major
dierence to the existing literature on one-way interconnection, where the incumbent alone
is proposing an access price. This contributes to the eciency of the mechanism since it
is less demanding in terms of information.
The resulting equilibrium prices are derived by employing a specic linear demand
specication. However, simulations suggest that they are robust with respect to other
demand schedules as well. In particular we nd that under fairly reasonable assumptions
such as, low marginal cost and products being close enough substitutes, an ordering pre-
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vails where equilibrium Ramsey prices are lowest, prices under an fa1; a2g-mechanism are
slightly higher or equal and duopoly prices, i.e. the specic access price regulated at cost,
are highest.
Analogously, welfare is maximal in the Ramsey program, fa1; a2g-mechanism welfare
is second and access prices regulated at cost least favorable.
Since the linear model is very specic, natural extensions involve a general treatment
of the proposed mechanism and the like, as well as extending the model to situations where
n entrants are active in the market.
Another natural application of our proposal are models of two-way interconnection in
the spirit of Armstrong (1998), Laont et al. (1998a,b).
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3.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. In order to show the result, we derive best response functions
for given parameter values in the second stage. We then turn to the analysis of the rst
stage and show, that proposition 3.1 characterizes indeed a sub game perfect equilibrium.
Before turning to rms' best response curves, note that prot functions have are dened
piecewise due to the demand specication. In particular,
I =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
MI for 0  pI  pE 1
DI for
pE 1
 < pI < 1 + pE
A(pI ; pE) for 1 + pE  pI
(A.3.1)
E =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ME for 0  pE  pI 1
DE for
pI 1
 < pE < 1 + pI
 A(pI ; pE) for 1 + pI  pE
(A.3.2)
where
DI = (pI   2c)qI(pI ; pE)  cqE(pI ; pE) + a1pI + a2pE
DE = (pE   c)qE(pI ; pE)  a1pI   a2pE :
whenever both rms face positive demand and
MI = (pI   2c)(1 + )
 
1  (1  )pI

+ a1pI + a2pE
ME = (pE   c)(1 + )
 
1  (1  )pE
  a1pI   a2pE
whenever prices are such that either rm is driven out of the market.
2nd Stage
The equilibrium of the pricing game has to be analyzed given the choice of a1 and a2 in
the previous period of the game. That means, we need an equilibrium choice of (pI ; pE)
for every possible combination of a1  0 and a2  0.
Before deriving best response functions, let us introduce important cut o values and
clarify notation for the reminder. The rst thing that is worth mentioning concerns the
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functions MI , 
M
E , 
D
I and 
D
E . Note that all these functions are quadratic and concave
in their respective prices, i.e. E's prots are concave in pE whereas I's prots are concave
in pI . It follows that each exhibit a maximum in the corresponding price. They are given
by22
pMI =
1 +  + a1
2(1  2) + c (A.3.3)
pME =
1 +    a2
2(1  2) +
c
2
(A.3.4)
pDI =
1
2
(1 + a1 + pE   c) + c (A.3.5)
pDE =
1
2
(1  a2 + pI + c): (A.3.6)
Whether these prices are in a rm's feasible set depends crucially on the pricing decision
of the opponent rm. As discussed above, the price spread determines which demand the
rm faces, hence it also determines, of which shape the prot functions are. The other
determinants of these maxima are the coecients a1 and a2. It makes sense to indicate
this by using the notation pMI (a1), p
M
E (a2), p
D
I (a1; pE) and p
D
E (a2; pI).
The cut o prices for which a rm switches from monopolistic to duopolistic behavior
are also of great importance to the analysis of the optimal pricing strategy. For them will
use the notation
pSI (pE) =
pE   1

pSE(pI) =
pI   1

:
At these points the prot functions are non-dierentiable, since for pi  pSi rm i has to
deal with Mi , whereas for pi > p
S
i 
D
i is valid.
Depending on the parameters a1 and a2, given prices pI and pE and the shape of the dif-
ferent parts of (A.3.1) and (A.3.2), overall prots can be single-peaked or double-peaked23.
For deriving the best response functions it is most instructive to look at characteristic in-
tervals of a1 and a2. Given these intervals, we identify the best response curve by varying
the opponents price.
In order to identify these intervals, we have to introduce two more prices for each rm.
22Note that super- and subscripts are in line with the notation of the respective prot functions.
23This follows from the quadratic and concave nature of (A.3.1) and (A.3.2).
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1. E = pE
pSI (pE) = pDI (pE ; a1). Notice that for pE  E implies pDI (pE ; a1) 
pSI (pE). In line with that denition, I = pI
pSE(pI) = pDE (pI ; a2).
2. E = pE
pSI (pE) = pMI (a1). Since pSI (pE) is increasing in pE , pE  E implies
pSI (pE)  pMI (a1). Analogously I = pI
pSE(pI) = pME (a2).
In our model, these values turn out to be
E(a1) =
2 + (1 + a1 + 2c  c)
2  2
I(a2) =
2 + (1 + c  a2)
2  2
E(a1) =
2 + (1 + a1 + 2c     2c2)
2(1  2)
I(a2) =
2 + (1 + c  a2      c2)
2(1  2) :
The arguments of 's and  's emphasize the dependence on parameter values a1 and a2.
It is easy to verify, that E(a1) and E(a1) are increasing in a1, whereas I(a2) and I(a2)
are decreasing in a2. Furthermore,
@E
@a1
< @E@a1 and
@I
@a2
> @I@a2 .
The relationship of (A.3.3)-(A.3.6), E(a1), I(a2), E(a1) and I(a2) depends on a1
and a2. To keep the notation as simple as possible, we dene the following threshold values
upfront:
11 = c      1  2c 12 = 1 +  + c
21 = 2c
2      1  2c 22 = 1 +  + c  c2
31 =  (2c(1  )2 + )
1 + 

32 = (1  c(1  ))(1 + )
41 =  1  2c+ c 42 = 1 + c
Subscripts indicate the respective parameter, i.e. i1 is a specic value for a1, the parameter
that rm E decides upon. For future reference it has to be noted that 11 < 
2
1 < 
3
1 < 
4
1 <
0 and 0 < 52 < 
4
2 < 
3
2 < 
2
2 < 
1
2 given our parameter restrictions of 0  c < 12 <   1.
Hence, fa1; a2g-space is subdivided into mutually exclusive sets.
It is easy to verify that for a1  11 neither pDI (a1; pE) nor pMI (a1) are feasible for
pE  0. For a2  12 neither pDE (a2; pI) nor pME (a2) are in E's feasible set for pI  0..
Whenever 11  a1  21, only pDI (a1; pE) is feasible for some pE  0. Likewise,
22  a2  12 implies that only pDE (a2; pI) is feasible for some pI  0. For 21  a1  31,
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both pMI (a1) and p
D
I (a1; pE) are feasible for some pE  0. Again, for 32  a2  22 both
pMI (a1) and p
D
I (a1; pE) are part of E for some pI  0. Furthermore it is easy to verify
that a1  31 implies that E(a1)  E(a1) and a2  32 implies that I(a2)  I(a2). But
jaij  j3i j implies that j(ai)  j(ai). Finally for jaij  j4i j, pDi (ai; 0)  0, whereas for
jaij < j4i j, pDi (ai; 0) > 024.
The relationship between 's and  's determines the shape of the prot functions in
(A.3.1) and (A.3.2) for dierent values of pE and pI . In general, there are two possibilities:
either we have i > i or i > i. Therefore 
3
1 and 
3
2 are important benchmarks to look
at, since E(
3
1) = E(
3
1). Because of the slope conditions and the linearity of 's and
 's in a1 and a2, E(a1) > E(a1) for a1 < 
3
1 and a2 > 
3
2. By the denition of i
and i, we know that for pi  i(aj), i = I; E, j is a single-peaked function, with the
global maximum at pDj (aj ; pi). Whenever i(aj) < pi < i(aj), the prot of rm j is
bi-modal. The two local maxima are pMj (aj) and p
D
j (aj ; pi) where we have the the relation
pMj (aj) < p
D
j (aj ; pi). For pi  i(aj), j is again single-peaked with the global maximum
occurring at pMj (aj).
Let us now turn to the situation where a1 > 
3
1 and a2 < 
3
2, that is i(aj) < i(aj).
This implies that for pi  i(aj), the only viable maximum of j is pj = pj(aj ; pi). For
i(aj) < pi < i(aj), the function j is again single-peaked. However neither p
M
j (aj)
nor pDj (aj ; pi) are in the feasible set of rm j. Consider p
S
j (pi), the price at which the
change in regimes from Mj to 
D
j occurs. To the right (pj > p
S
j (pi)) 
D
j is valid. Its
maximum occurs at pDj (aj ; pi) < p
S
j (pi), hence j is decreasing for pj > p
S
j (pj). To
the left (pj < p
S
j (pi)) 
M
j is valid, for which the maximum occurs at p
M
j (aj) > p
S
j (aj).
Hence j is increasing up to p
S
j (pi). This implies that the global maximum occurs at
pSj (pi). For pi  i(aj), j's prot is again single-peaked with pj = pMj (aj). Equipped with
this information, we can now turn to the derivation of I's and E's best response curves,
p^(a1; pE) and p^E(a2; pI) respectively.
24Notice that subscript i on prices refers to a rm, whereas on parameters it refers to a number. However
1 is meant to correspond with rm I and 2 with E.
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I's Best Response Curves
To account for dierent shapes of I's prot, we proceed by case based analysis of the best
response function. We do this by xing a1 to be in dierent intervals. Note that this
makes I's prot a function of pE alone. Therefore, within the dierent cases, pE is varied.
i) a1  11 : Since 11 < 31 we know that E(a1) < E(a1). We also know that by
means of the regulatory mechanism, prices are required to be non-negative. This
puts an additional restriction on pDI (a1; pE) and p
M
I (a1).
Let us start with 0  pE  1. Whenever this is the case, we know that pSI (pE)  0.
This implies that I has no opportunity to set pI such that his opponent is driven out
of the market. In other words, DI is the relevant branch of the prot function for
pI  0. Notice that E(11) = 1. This is to say, that pDI (11; 1) = pSI (1)=0. Because
@E
@a1
> 0, we have E(a1) < 1 for all a1 < 
1
1. Hence for 0  pE  1, DI is a
decreasing function for pI  0. This in turn implies that the best response to any
pE 2 [0; 1] is setting p^I(a1; pE) = 0.
Whenever pE > 1, we also know that pE > E(a1). Hence I is single-peaked with
the maximum occurring at pMI (a1). It is easy to verify that for a1  11, this is always
negative, meaning that it is never in the feasible set of rm I. Since we know that
for pE  E(aI), pMI (a1) is the only maximum of I , which is also non-increasing
beyond pMI (a1), we can conclude that again the optimal pricing strategy for I is
picking p^I(a1; pE) = 0.
ii) 11 < a1  21 : The parameter restrictions imply special relationships. First of
all, it is important to realize, that for a1  21, pMI (a1)  0. Secondly we know
that E(a1) > 1 for a1 2 [11; 21]. Furthermore, since 21 < 31, we know that
E(a1) < E(a1).
Let us again start with 0  pE  1. pSI (pE)  0, which means that for pI  0,
I = 
D
i . E(a1) > 1 implies that there has to be an interval [0(a1; 1], where
pDI (a1; pE)  0. This is the global maximum of DI and therefore the best response
of I to pE 2 [0(a1); 1]. Because pDI (a1; pE) is increasing in pE , it is less than zero
for pE 2 [0; 0(a1)[.
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Now consider the case of pE 2]1; E(a1)[. I is a bimodal function, with a local
maximum pMI (a1) < 0 and p
D
I (a1; pE) > 0. For pI  pSI (pE), I = MI which is
decreasing in pI . For pI > p
S
I (pE), I = 
D
I , which is maximized at p
D
I (a1; pE) >
pSI (pE). This means that for 0  pI  pSI (pE), I is decreasing, whereas for pSI (pE) <
pI  pDI (a1; pE) it is increasing. The candidates for a best response are either pI = 0
or pI = p
D
I (a1; pE) and whenever 
M
I (pI = 0) > 
D
I (pI = p
D
I (a1; pE)), I picks the
former and vice versa. Let us now consider the function
0(pE ; a1) = 
M
I (pI = 0; pE) DI (pI = pDI (a1; pE); pE): (A.3.7)
Notice that for pE = 1, i.e. p
S
I (1) = 0, 0(pE ; a1) < 0 because I is a continuous
function. Furthermore at pE = E(a1), 0(pE ; a1) is positive, by the same argument.
Because of its components, 0(pE ; a1) is concave and quadratic in pE , hence exhibits
at most two roots that solve 0(pE ; a1) = 0. Notice that because of the concavity
condition, 0(pE ; a1) > 0 in between these two roots. This also implies that we have
to look for the smaller of these two roots, because we know that in the pE-interval
that we are looking at, 0(pE ; a1) moves from negative to positive. Let us call this
value 1(a1). It is given by
1(a1) =
 2c  (c   1  a1 + 2c) + 2
p
c(2   1)((c      1  a1)  c)
2
To show that 1(a1) is in fact a real number, notice that the term in the square root
is decreasing in a1. Hence it reaches its minimal value at 
2
1, the upper bound of
the interval. But this is given by
c(2   1)((c      1  21)  c) = c2(2   1)(1  2) > 0:
Furthermore 1 < 1(a1) < E(a1) because 0(a1; 1) < 0 and 0(a1; E(a1)) >
0. Notice that because of the second inequality, the other root of 0(pE ; a1) = 0
becomes irrelevant since it is larger than E(a1). In that case, p
D
I (a1; pE) is not part
of I's feasible set anymore. Hence for pE  1(a1), I's best response turns out to be
p^I(a1; pE) = 0. For The interval [1(a1); E(a1)], we found that p^I(a1; pE)0 must be
I's optimal strategy. For pE > E(a1) I is decreasing for pI  0, hence again we
have p^I(a1; pE) = 0.
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Formally the best response is given by
p^I(a1; pE) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 for 0  pE < 0(a1)
pDI for 0(a1)  pE < 1(a1)
0 for 1(a1)  pE
(A.3.8)
where
0(a1) =
c   1  a1   2c

:
iii) 21 < a1  31 : Whenever a1 satises the conditions above, the analysis for pE 2 [0; 1]
remains as in case ii). pSI (pE)  0 is always the case for o  pE  1, which implies
that I = 
D
I and p
D
I (a1; pE)  0 remains the maximum for 0(a1)  pE  1.
However notice that 0(a1) is decreasing in a1. Nevertheless it is still positive because
0(
4
1) = 0 and 
4
1 > 
3
1.
a1  21 implies pMI (a1)  0, which means that the analysis changes for pE > 1.
E(a1), the value at for which p
S
I (pE) = p
M
I is now greater than one. This has to be
the case because pSI (pE) > 0 only for values of pE > 1. But for a1  31 we know
that E(a1)  E(a1) > 0. Since we already know that for pE  E(a1) the function
I is single peaked with its maximum occurring at pI = p
D
I (a1; pE), we can conclude
that this is I's optimal choice of pI up to E(a1).
For pE 2 [E(a1; E(a1)] I's prot function exhibits two local maxima, which are
both positive, namely pMI (a1) and p
D
I (a1; pE). In line with the discussion in ii) let
us dene
1(pE ; a1) = 
M
i (p
m
I (a1); pE) DI (pDI (a1; pE); pE):
Whenever 1(pE ; a1) < 0 I chooses p^I(a1; pE) = p
D
I (a1; pE), whenever 1(pE ; a1) >
0, p^I(a1; pE) = p
M
I (a1). Again 1(pE ; a1)is quadratic and concave in pE , which
means that we nd at most two pE that satisfy 1(pE ; a1) = 0. It is important
to realize that 1(E(a1); a1)  0 whereas 1(E(a1); a1) > 0. This simply follows
from continuity and the characteristics if I at E(a1) and E(a1). It implies that
we are looking for the smaller of the two roots, because then 1(pE ; a1) changes
from negative to positive which is due to its quadratic and concave form. It is easy
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to verify that this root is given by
2 =
c2 + 2c      a1   2c
2
  2c(1  )(1  
2) + (1 +  + a1)
2
p
(1  2) :
When pE is increased beyond 2, 1 is still bi-modal. However as 1 > 0 p
M
I (a1) is
the global maximum. This is actually true for the interval [2; E(a1)]. At E(a1),
pSI (pE) = p
D
I (a1; pE) is by denition satised. To the left of the cut-o point, we
are on the decreasing branch of MI , exactly at p
S
I (pE) the maximum of 
D
I occurs,
hence for pI > p
S
I I = 
D
I which is decreasing. This implies that at pE = E(a1)
the function I exhibits a point of terrace.
As we already saw above, for pE > E(a1) I's prot is single-peaked with a global
maximum at pMI (a1) > 0. We can now state the best response of I for the whole
interval as given by
p^I(a1; pE) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 for 0  pE < 0(a1)
pDI for 0(a1)  pE < 2(a1)
pMI for 2(a1)  pE
(A.3.9)
iv) 31 < a1  41 : The rst inequality implies that 1 < E(a1) < E(a1) and the
second insures that 0(a1)  0, hence stetting p^I(a1; pE) = 0 is a best response to
0  pE  0(a1).
I's best response for pE 2 [0; 1] is by now familiar. Since pSI  0, we have I = DI
for pI  0. we also know that for pE  0, pDI (a1; pE)  0. Hence for pE > 0(a1),
p^I(a1; pE) = p
D
I (a1; pE).
Now consider the case of pE > 1. We know that 1 < E(a1) < E(a1). This gives us
a very clear picture of how I looks like, as we increase pE . For 1 < pE  E(a1) I's
prot peaks at pI = p
D
I (a1; pE). Qualitatively we can think of the graph of I(pI)
as follows: for 0  pI  pSI (pE) we have I = MI , which is increasing. pMI (a1)
is not in I's feasible set until pE  E(a1). For pI > pSI (pE), I = DI . Because
pE  E(a1), this function peaks at pDI (a1; pE) > pSI (pE). Hence I's optimal pricing
strategy for 1 < pE  E(a1) is p^I(a1; pE) = pDI .
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For E(a1) < pE  E(a1) the picture changes such that pDI (a1; pE) < pSI (pE).
This simply says that neither pDI (a1; pE) nor p
M
I (a1) are part of the feasible set
anymore. However observe that I exhibits a unique global maximum at p
S
I (pE),
because to the left of this point I = 
M
i , which is increasing (pE  E(a1)).
To the right I = 
D
I is decreasing (pE > E(a1)). This means that for any
pE 2 [E(a1); E(a1)], p^I(a1; pE) = pSI (pE).
The last inequality to analyze is E(a1) < pE , which implies that p
M
I (a1) < p
S
I .
Given what has been said so far, the situation is straightforward. As before, to
the right of pSI (pE), the function decreasing. If I drives E out of the market, i.e.
pI  pSI (pE), I = MI . Hence the global maximum is p^I(a1; pE) = pMI (a1).
Summing up this case, we nd that the the best response of I is given by
p^I(a1; pE) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
0 for 0  pE < 0(a1)
pDI for 0(a1)  pE < E(a1)
pSI for E(a1)  pE < E(a1)
pMI for E(a1)  pE
(A.3.10)
v) 41 < a1  0 : This case can be analyzed very easily. Compared to case iv) nothing
actually changes except that 0(a1) < 0. This implies that pI = 0 is never a best
response for I to any pE . The rest of the analysis remains as laid down in iv). Hence
the best response is given by
p^I(a1; pE) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
pDI for 0  pE < E(a1)
pSI for E(a1)  pE < E(a1)
pMI for E(a1)  pE
(A.3.11)
These ve dierent cases characterize I's optimal choices of pI for any a1 2 [ 1; 0].
It is important to notice, that any of the (A.3.8), (A.3.9), (A.3.10) or (A.3.11) depend on
a2. In the next section we present the same exercise for rm E. Just as in this section,
we can identify ve dierent intervals, conditioned on a2.
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E's Best Response Curves
The restriction on a2 to be non-negative together with the four dierent cut o values
12   42 dene ve mutually exclusive sets in a2-space. Hence we have to look at ve
dierent cases. Within each, a2 is xed, only pI is varied from zero to innity. Using this
strategy we derive the best response function p^E(a2; pI) for every a2-interval. Notice that
the dierent sets of a2 imply dierent shapes of prot functions, for pI  0. Characteristic
plots of these prot functions are provided in appendix B.
i) a2  12 : For all a2 > 32 we know that I(a2) < I(a2). Since 12 > 32, this
is certainly satised here. Additionally we know that for a2  12, pME (a2) and
pDE (a2; pI) are never feasible strategies of E.
Consider 0  pI  1. By the denition of E and pSE(pI) we know that E does have
no opportunity to drive I out of the market, since pSE(pI)  0. Hence E = DE
is the relevant part of the E's prot for pE  0. Because I(12) = 1, the ordering
pME (a2)  pSE(pI)  pDE (a2; pI)  0 is valid for 0  pI  I(a2)  1. Because of the
non-negativity restriction on prices, neither pDE (a2; pI) nor p
M
E (a2) are in E's feasible
set. For pI  I(a2) pDE (a2; pI)  pSE(pI), hence it is not on the valid branch of
E . Notice that p
M
E (a2) does not depend on pI and is always smaller than zero for
a2 2 [12;1]. Hence although pSE(pI) > I(a2), pME (a2) is not feasible. Therefore,
E's prot is always downward sloping for pE  0 and pI 2 [0; 1] and the optimal
price is p^E(a2; pI) = 0
For pI > 1, the picture does not change. Recall that p
M
E (a2)  pDE (a2; pI) < pSE(pI)
and pSE(pI) > 0. Hence E is always decreasing for pE  0. Notice that for
0  pE  pSE(pI), ME is valid. Since pME (a2) < 0, this part is also downward
sloping. To sum up, we can see that for a2  12, The best response of E to any pI
is p^E(a2; pI) = 0.
ii) 12 > a2  22 : Recall that 22 is dened such that for all a2  22, pME (a2)  0.
Additionally since 22 > 
3
2, I(a2) > I(a2).
Consider 0  pI  1. Because a2 < 12, I(a2) > 1. For pI = 1, we have 0 = pSE <
pDE (a2; pI), where the last inequality stems from the fact, that I(a2) > 1. Recall
AN INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT 70
that 22 < 
4
2, hence p
D
E (a2; 0) < 0. Since p
D
E (a2; pI) is increasing in pI , there has to
exist a pI = 0(a2) > 0, for which p
D
E (a2; pI) = 0. Therefore, for 0  pI  0(a2), the
optimal choice of E is p^E(a2; pI) = 0. For 0(a2) < pI  1, p^E(a2; pI) = pDE (a2; pI).
For ]1; I(a2)], E is bimodal, with the ordering p
M
E  0 < pSE(pI)  pDE (a2; pI).
Notice that
@E
@pE
jpE2(0;pSE(pI)] =
@ME
@pE
jpE2(0;pSE(pI)] < 0 and
@E
@pE
jpE2[pSE(pI);pDE (a2;pI)] =
@DE
@pE
jpE2[pSE(pI);pDE (a2;pI)]  0;
because for pE  pSE(pI), E = ME which is maximized at pME (a2)  0 and for
pE > p
S
E(pI), E = 
D
E which is maximized at p
D
E (a2; pI)  pSE(pI). This in turn
says that the candidate equilibria are either pE = 0 if 
M
E (pI ; pE = 0) > 
D
E (pI ; pE =
pDE (a2; pI)) or pE = p
D
E (a2; pI) otherwise.
Now consider the function
 0(a2; pI) = 
M
E (pI ; pE = 0) DE (pI ; pE = pDE (a2; pI)):
Because ME (pI ; p
S
E(pI)) = 
D
E (pI ; p
S
E(pI)), we know that for pI = 1,  0(a2; pI) < 0.
However since ME is decreasing in pE  0, we have  0(a2; pI) > 0 at pI = I(a2).
Recall that I(a2) is the value of pI , for which p
D
E (a2; pI) = p
S
E(pI). Hence, for
pI > I(a2), p
M
E (a2) < 0 < p
D
E (a2; pI) < p
S
E(pI). Because of its building blocks,
 0(a2; pI) is concave and quadratic in pI . Hence there are at most two roots in pI
satisfying  0(a2; pI) = 0. Notice that we are looking for the smaller root of the
two. From the shape of  0(a2; pI) it is easy to verify that we have to move from
 0(a2; pI) < 0 to  0(a2; pI) > 0. This is indeed the case for the pI -interval we
interested in. Solving  0(a2; pI) = 0 and calling the smaller root 1(a2), we get
1(a2) =
c  1 + a2   2
p
(c(a2   1  )

:
For a2 2 [22; 12], 1(a2) is indeed a real number, because 22 > 1 + . Notice that
by denition, 1(a2) > 1. Furthermore the second root of  0(a2; pI) = 0 is irrelevant
because it is larger than I(a2). In between the two roots,  0(a2; pI) > 0, which is
certainly the case for  0(a2; pI = I(a2)).
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For pI > I(a2), p
M
I (a2)  0 < pDI (a2; pI) < pSE(pI). This implies that E is
decreasing for all pI  0. Hence we can now state E's best response formally as
p^I(a2; pI) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 for 0  pI < 0(a2)
pDE for 0(a2)  pI < 1(a2)
0 for 1(a2)  pI
(A.3.12)
where
0(a2) =
a2   1  c

:
iii) 22 > a2  32 : Because a2  32, I(a2) > I(a2). This implies pME (a2)  pE 
pDE (a2; pI) for I(a2)  pI  I(a2). Notice that I(22) = 1 , pME (22) = 0. Hence
for pI < 1, p
S
E(pI) < 0 < p
M
I (a2) < pI(a2; pI). However since E = 
D
E for pE  0
and pI  1, the analysis does not change for 0  pI  1 as compared to the
previous case. Recall that 32 > 
4
2, which implies that p
D
E (a2; 0) < 0. Therefore, for
0  pI  0(a2), p^E(a2; pI) = 0 and for 0(a2)  pI  1, p^E(a2; pI) = pDE (a2; pI).
Notice that for pI 2 [1; I(a2)], 0  pSE(pI) < pMI (a2) < pI(a2; pI) and therefore
p^E(a2; pI) = p
D
E (a2; pI). However for I(a2) < pI  I(a2), pME (a2) < pSE(pI) 
pDE (a2; pI). This is to say that E is now bi-modal, which implies that the optimal
strategy for E is either pME (a2) or p
D
E (a2; pI). Recall that both are non-negative. Let
us consider the function
 1(pI ; a2) = 
M
E (pI ; p
M
E (a2)) DE (pI ; pDE (a2; pI)):
Notice that if  1(a2; pI) > 0, p^E(a2; pI) = p
D
E (a2; pI). For  1(a2; pI) < 0, p^E(a2; pI) =
pME (a2). It is easy to see that  1(a2; I(a2)) < 0 and  1(a2; I(a2)) > 0. Notice
that for pI = I(a2), p
S
E(pI) = p
M
E (a2), hence
@E
pE
> 0 for 0  pE  pSE(pI).
However because I(a2)  I(a2), pDE (a2; I(a2))  pSE(I(a2)), hence E is in-
creasing in pE up to p
D
E (a2; pI). This implies that  1(a2; I(a2)) < 0. At pI =
I(a2), p
S
E(pI) = p
D
E (a2; pI), implying that for
@E
pE
< 0 for pE > p
S
E(pI). Further-
more, because I(a2)  I(a2), pME (a2)  pSE(I(a2)). Hence E is decreasing for
pME (a2) < pE  pSE(pI) and  (a2; I(a2)) > 0. It is easy to see that  1(a2; pI) is
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concave and quadratic in pI , because of the shapes of 
M
E and 
D
E . This implies
that  1(a2; pI) = 0 has two solutions in pI at most. Finding the smaller of these
roots 2(a2) identies intervals, [I(a2); 2(a2)], where p^E(a2; pI) = p
D
E (a2; pI) and
[2(a2); I(a2)] where p^E(a2; pI) = p
M
E (a2). It is straightforward to verify that
2 =
c+ a2   1

  1 +  + c
2   c  a2

p
1  2
Notice that 2(a2) 2 [I(a2); I(a2)]. The second root of  1(a2; pI) = 0 is irrele-
vant, because since  1(a2; I(a2)) > 0, it is greater than I(a2), where p
M
E (a2) <
pDE (a2; pI) < p
S
E(a2). Hence for pI  I(a2), p^E(a2; pI) = pME (a2). This case can be
summed up by the following best response curve
p^E =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 for 0  pI < 0(a2)
pDE for 0(ae)  pI < 2(a2)
pME for 2(a2)  pI
(A.3.13)
iv) 32 > a2  42 : Notice that this implies 0(a2)  0 since a2  42. Additionally
I(a2) > 1 and I(a2) > 1, hence for 0  pI  0(a2), pSE(pI) < pDE (a2; pI) 
0 < pME (a2). For 0(a2) < pI  1, pSE(pI)  0 < pDE (a2; pI) < pME (a2). Hence
p^E(a2; pI) = 0 for 0  pI  0(a2) and p^E(a2; pI) = pDE (a2; pI) for all 0(a2) < pI  1.
Furthermore, since a2 < 
3
2, I(a2) < I(a2). Therefore, for 1 < pI  I(a2),
0 < pSE(pI)  pDE (a2; pI) < pME (a2) and p^E(a2; pI) = pDE (a2; pI). For I(a2) < pI 
I(a2), 0 < p
D
E (a2; pI) < p
S
E(pI)  pME (a2). Note that neither pME (a2) nor pDE (a2; pI)
are in the feasible set of E. However that is to say that E = 
M
E is increasing
in pE for pE  pSE(pI) and E = DE is decreasing in pE for pE > pSE(pI). This
in turn implies that E is single-peaked at p
S
E(pI), which is then E's global prot
maximum. Hence p^E(a2; pI) = p
S
E(pI) for pI 2 [I(a2); I(a2)].
If pI > I(a2), 0 < p
D
E (a2; pI) < p
S
E(pI) and p
M
E (a2) < p
S
E(pI), which implies a
unique prot maximum at pME (a2), i.e. p^E(a2; pI) = p
M
E (a2). Summing up, E's best
response for 32 > a2  42 is given by
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p^E =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
0 for 0  pI < 0(a2)
pDE for 0(a2)  pI < I(a2)
pSE for I(a2)  pI < I(a2)
pME for I(a2)  pI
(A.3.14)
v) 42 > a2  0 : Notice that since a2 < 32, I(a2) < I(a2), hence the analysis is
similar to that of case iv). However a2 < 
4
2, which implies that p
D
E (a2; 0) > 0, i.e.
0(a2) < 0. This implies that the best response of E for 
4
2 > a2  0 is given by
p^E =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
pDE for 0(a2)  pI < I(a2)
pSE for I(a2)  pI < I(a2)
pME for I(a2)  pI
(A.3.15)
The ve dierent cases characterize E's best response to any pI  0 for dierent a2. It
has to be noted that neither best response depends on a1. This actually implies that there
25 dierent combinations of I and E's best responses, with each exhibiting a possibly
dierent equilibrium in prices. The next section analyzes these possibilities.
Pricing Equilibrium
This section derives the pricing equilibrium in the 2nd stage of the game, given the ndings
of the previous subsection. For doing that, the following lemma turns out to be helpful
Lemma A.3.1. Let p^I(a1; pE) and p^E(a2; pI) be the best response functions of I and E
respectively as given in the previous sections. Then
p^I(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) 8a1 < ~a1 and pE  0
p^E(~a2; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) 8a2 < ~a2 and pI  0
Proof. Let us start with rm I. Fix 41  ~a1  0. This immediately implies E(~a1) 
E(~a1) and the best response function is given as in case v). Recall that for 0  pE 
E(~a1), p^I(~a1; pE) = p
D
I (~a1; pE), for E(~a1) < pE  E(~a1), p^I(~a1; pE) = pSI (pE) and
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for (~a1) < pE , p^I(~a1; pE) = p
M
I (a1). Consider a1 < ~a1 in [
4
1; 0]. Note that
@E
@a1
> 0
and @E@a1 > 0. Additionally increasing a1 shifts up p
D
I (a1; pE). Moreover by denition of
E(a1), p
D
I (a1; pE)  pSI (pI) for pE  E(a1). Since pSI (pE) is independent of a1, this
implies p^I(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) for all a1 < ~a1 in [41; 0] and 0  pE  (~a1). Notice
that for a1 < ~a1 it is well possible that E(a1; pE) < E(~a1). However for pE  E(a1),
pMI (a1)  pSI (pE), hence p^I(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) is indeed satised for 0  pE  E(~a1).
Consider E(~a1) < pE  E(~a1). For a1 < ~a1, E(a1) < E(~a1) as well as E(a1) <
E(~a1). Notice that p
M
I (a1)  pSI (a1) for E(a1)  pE and pSI (pE) is independent of a1,
hence p^I(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) for all a1 < ~a1 in [41; 0] and 0  pE  (~a1).
Finally we look at E(~a1) < pE . For a1 < ~a1, E(a1) < E(~a1) and p
M
I (a1) < p
M
I (~a1).
Hence p^I(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) for all a1 < ~a1 in [41; 0] and pE  0.
Suppose ~a1 2 [31; 41]. Notice that the best response curve as given by case iv) only
diers from that in case v) for 0  pE  0(~a1), where p^I(~a1; pE) = 0. Since @0@a1 < 0
and pDI (~a1; pE)  0 for pE  0(~a1), we can conclude that p^I(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) for all
a1 < ~a1 in [
3
1; 0] and pE  0.
Now x ~a1 2 [21; 31]. p^I(~a1; pE) = 0 for 0  pE  0(~a1), p^I(~a1; pE) = pDI (~a1; pE)
for 0(~a1) < pE  2(~a1) and p^I(~a1; pE) = pMI (~a1) for 2(~a1) < pE . Notice that @2@a1 > 0.
Consider a1 < ~a1 in [
2
1; 
3
1]. Observe that
@0
@a1
< 0 hence p^I(~a1; pE) = p^I(a1; pE) for all
a1 < ~a1 in [
3
1; 0] and 0  pE  0(~a1).
Consider 0(~a1) < pE  2(~a1). Because @2@a1 > 0, for a1 < ~a1 in [21; 31], f0(a1); 2(a1)g 2
[0(~a1); 2(~a1)]. Notice that p
D
I (~a1; pE) > p
D
I (a1; pE) for all a1 < ~a1, and pE  0.
Moreover, pMI (a1)  pDI (a1; 2(a1)) for a1 2 [21; 31], hence p^I(~a1; pE) > p^I(a1; pE) for
0(~a1) < pE  2(~a1).
It easy to see that pMI (a1) < p
M
I (~a1) for a1 < ~a1, hence p^I(~a1; pE) > p^I(a1; pE) for
pE  0 for all a1 < ~a1 in [21; 31]. Notice that pMI (31) = pDI (31; 2(31)) = pDI (31; E(31)).
Therefore p^I(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) for pE  0 for all a1 < ~a1 in [21; 0].
Set ~a1 2 [11; 21]. p^I(~a1; pE) = 0 for 0  pE  0(~a1) and 1(~a1)  pE , p^I(~a1; pE) =
pDI (~a1; pE) for 0(~a1) < pE < 1(~a1). Consider a1 < ~a1. Notice that f0(a1); 1(a1)g 2
[0(~a1); 1(~a1)], because
@0
@a1
< 0 and @1@a1 > 0. Hence p^I(~a1; pE) = p^I(a1; pE) for 0 
pE  0(~a1) and 1(~a1)  pE . Moreover since pDI (~a1; pE) > pDI (a1; pE) for all a1 < ~a1 and
pE  0, p^(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) for pE  0. Notice that 1(21) = 2(21) and pMI (21 = 0),
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therefore p^(~a1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) for pE  0 and a1 < ~a1 in [11; 0].
Now for all a1 < 
1
1, p^I(a1; pE) = 0. Since p^I(a1; pE)  0 for all a1 2 [11; 0] we can
conclude that p^I(a1; pE)  p^I(~a1; pE) for all a1 < ~a1 in [ 1; 0] and p^I(0; pE) is indeed an
upper envelope for all a1 < 0 and pE  0.
Let us now turn to E's best response functions. We start with xing ~a2 2 [0; 42].
This immediately implies that E's best response is as given in case v), i.e. p^E(~a2; pI) =
pDE (~a2; pI) for 0  pI  I(~a2), p^E(~a2; pI) = pSE(pI) for I(~a2) < pI  I(~a2) and
p^E(~a2; pI) = p
M
E (~a2) for pI > I(~a2) . Consider a2 > ~a2 in [0; 
4
2]. Recall that
@I
@a2
< 0
as well as @I@a2 < 0, hence I(a2) < I(~a2). Since p
D
E (~a2; pI) > p
D
E (a2; pI) for a2 > ~a2 and
by denition of I(a2), p
D
E (~a2; pI)  pSE(pI) for pI  I(~a2), it follows that p^E(~a2; pI) 
p^E(a2; pI) for 0  pI  I(~a2). Notice that I(a2)  I(~a2) is also possible. How-
ever since pME (a2)  pSE(pI) for I(a2)  pI , p^E(~a2; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) is still satised for
0  pI  I(~a2).
Consider I(~a2) < pI  I(~a2). Because pSE(pI) is independent of a2 and pME (a2) 
pSE(pI) for I(a2)  pI , we have p^E(~a2; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) for any a2 > ~a2 in [0; 42].
For I(~a2) < pI , p^E(~a2; pI) = p
M
E (~a2). Because
@pME
@a2
< 0, p^E(~a2; pI) > p^E(a2; pI) for
a2 > ~a2 in [0; 
4
2] and pI  0.
Notice that case v) and case iv) best responses are similar except for 0  pI  0(a1).
Hence xing ~a2 2 [32; 42] yields exactly the same results as discussed before. Since
@0
@a2
> 0, p^E(~a2; pI) = p^E(a2; pI) = 0 for all a2 > ~a2 and 0  pI  0(a2). However
since pDE (~a2; pI)  0 for 0(~a2) < pI , and pDE (~a2; pI) > pDE (a2; pI) for a2 > ~a2, we can
conclude that p^E(~a2; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) for a2 > ~a2 in [42; 32] and pI  0. Moreover because
0(
4
2) = 0, this is true for all a2 > ~a2 in [0; 
3
2].
If ~a2 2 [32; 22], E's best response is given by p^(~a2; pI) = 0 for 0  pI  0(~a2),
p^E(~a2; pI) = p
D
E (~a2; pI) for 0(~a2) < pI  2(~a2) and p^E(~a2; pI) = pME (~a2) for 2(~a2) < pI .
Since @0@a2 > 0 and
@2
@a2
< 0, f0(a2); 2(a2)g 2 [0(~a2); 2(~a2)] for a2 > ~a2 in [32; 22]. For
0  pI  0(~a2), p^E(~a2; pI) = p^E(a2; pI) = 0.
Notice that pDE (~a2; pI) > 0 for 0(~a2) < pI  2(~a2) and pDE (~a2; pI) > pDE (a2; pI) for
a2 > ~a2. Moreover p
D
E (a2; 2(a2))  pMI (a2) for a2 2 [32; 22] and pME (~a2) > pME (a2) for
AN INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT 76
a2 > ~a2. Hence p^E(~a2; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) for a2 > ~a2 in [32; 22] and pI  0.
Furthermore pME (
3
2) = p
D
E (
3
2; 2(
3
2)) = p
D
E (
3
2; I(
3
2)) and I(
3
2) = I(
3
2) imply
that p^E(~a2; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) for a2 > ~a2 in [0; 22] and pI  0.
Set ~a2 2 [22; 12]. p^E(~a2; pI) = 0 for 0  pI  0(~a2) and 1(~a2)  pI . Since @0@a2 > 0
and @1@a2 < 0, f0(a2); 1(a2)g 2 [0(~a2); 1(~a2)] for a2 > ~a2 in [22; 12], hence p^E(~a2; pI) =
p^E(a2; pI) = 0 for 0  pI  0(a2) and 1(~a2)  pI . Since pDE (~a2; pI) > 0 for 0(~a2) <
pI  2(~a2) and pDE (~a2; pI) > pDE (a2; pI) for a2 > ~a2, p^E(~a2; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) for a2 > ~a2
in [22; 
1
2] and pI  0. Moreover because pDE (22; (22) = pDE (22; 2(22) and pME (22) = 0,
this holds for a2 > ~a2 in [0; 
1
1].
Now for a2 > 
1
2, p^E(a2; pI) = 0. Since p^E(a2; pI)  0 for all a2 2 [0; 12] we can
conclude that p^E(~a2; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) for all a2 < ~a2 in [0;1] and p^E(0; pI) is indeed an
upper envelope for all a2 > 0 and pI  0. 
Identifying upper envelopes for I and E also means identifying a set of price-tuples
(pI ; pE), that are candidate pricing equilibria. This set is dened as the intersection of
p^I(0; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) 8a1 < 0
p^E(0; pI)  p^E(a2; pI) 8a2 > 0
Identifying this set is equivalent to nding an intersection points of p^I(0; pE) and
p^E(0; pI). In order to nd these points we can proceed piecewise, this means for every
interval of the two best response functions. Lemma A.3.2 and ??? summarize the results
of this exercise.
Lemma A.3.2. Consider p^I(0; pE) and p^E(0; pI) for pI  pDI (0; E(0)) and pE  pDE (0; I(0)).
The unique intersection point of p^I(0; pE) and p^E(0; pI) is given by
pI(0; 0) =
1
2   +
c(4  )
4  2
pE(0; 0) =
1
2   +
c((2  ) + 2)
4  2
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Proof. Consider the functions pDI (a1; pE) and p
D
E (a2; pI). Simple algebra shows that
these intersect at
pI(a1; a2) =
1
2   +
c(4  )
4  2 +
2a1   a2
4  2 (A.3.16)
pE(a1; a2) =
1
2   +
c((2  ) + 2)
4  2 +
a1   2a2
4  2 (A.3.17)
It is easy to verify, pI(a1; a2)  0 and pE(a;a2)  0 if
a1  
2

c+ a2   1

  1  2c (A.3.18)
a2  
2

1 + a1   c

+ 1 + c + c (A.3.19)
These inequalities are certainly satised for a1 = 0 and a2 = 0. Additionally, for a1 =
a2 = 0,
pI(0; 0) < p
D
I (0; E(0)) ,
(2 +    2c(1  ))
(4  2)(2  2) > 0
pE(0; 0) < p
D
E (0; I(0)) ,


2 +    c 4 + (1  ) 1  
(4  2)(2  2) > 0
which is satised for  2 [12 ; 1] and c 2 [0; 12 ]. It is easy to see that
I(0) > p
D
I (0; E(0))
E(0) > p
D
E (0; I(0));
which is to say that for pI  pDI (0; E(0)) and pE  pDE (0; I(0)), it is only pDI (0; pE) and
pDE (0; pI) that we care about in the best response function. Hence because of the linearity
of pDI (0; pE) and p
D
E (0; pI), we can conclude that lemma A.3.2 is indeed true. 
Notice that lemma A.3.2 implies that a set of equilibrium candidates is given by
0  pI  pDI (0; pE) (A.3.20)
0  pE  pDE (0; pI): (A.3.21)
To show that this is the only set of candidate equilibria, consider lemma A.3.3.
Lemma A.3.3. p^I(0; pE) and p^E(0; pI) cross only once for pI  0 and pE  0.
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Proof. Since Lemma A.3.2 provides an intersection point for pI  pDI (0; E(0)) and
pE  pDE (0; I(0)), we have to show that p^I(0; pE) and p^E(0; pI) cannot cross in the rest
of the positive quadrant. This can be done by observing the dierent parts of E and I's
best response curves and their possible combinations.
It is obvious that pDI (a1; 0) < 1 for all a1  0 as well as pDE (a2; 0) < 1 for all a2  0.
Furthermore we have
@pDI
@pE
= =2 <

@pSE
@pI
 1
=  and
@pSI
@pE
= 1= <

@pDE
@pI
 1
= 2=.
These conditions ensure that pDI (a1; pE) and p
S
E(pI) as well as p
D
E (a2; pI) and p
S
I (pE) can
never cross in the northwest quadrant, that is with pI  0 and pE  0.
Additionally we can rule out the intersection of pSI (pE) and p
S
E(pI). This occurs at
pI = pE =
1
1  . However since E(0) <
1
1  and I(0) <
1
1  , this intersection point is
never in the feasible set for any a1  0 and a2  0.
This also implies that the best response function do not cross for pE  E(a1) and
pI  I(a2) because of their shape. Hence Lemma A.3.2 yields the unique intersection
point of p^I(0; pE) and p^E(0; pI). 
We can therefore conclude that (A.3.20) and (A.3.21) describe the only set of candidate
equilibria of the pricing game. It also implies that pSI (pE) and p
S
E(pI) can never part of
an equilibrium, as well as pMI (a1) and p
M
E (a2) for a1 2 [31; 0] and a2 2 [0; 32].
Proposition A.3.1. Suppose 41  a1  0 and 0  a2  42. Best response functions of
I and E are given by cases v). Then the equilibrium prices are given by
pI(a1; a2) =
1
2   +
c(4  )
4  2 +
2a1   a2
4  2
pE(a1; a2) =
1
2   +
c((2  ) + 2)
4  2 +
a1   2a2
4  2
Proof. Notice that Lemma A.3.3 implies thatpMI (a1), p
M
E (a2) can not be part of the
equilibrium for a1 2 [31; 0] and a2 2 [0; 32] as well as pSI (pE) and pSE(pI). Hence we
only have to look at pDI (a1; pE) and p
D
E (a2; pI). These have a unique intersection point at
pI(a1; a2) and p

E(a1; a2). 
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Proposition A.3.2. Suppose a1  41 and 42  a2. Best response functions of I and E
are given by cases i)-iv). Then the equilibrium prices are given by
pI = 0 and p

E = 0
Proof. By lemma A.3.2 we know that p^I(
4
1; pE)  p^I(a1; pE) 8 a1  41 and p^E(42; pI) 
p^E(a2; pI) 8 a2  42. It is easy to verify that pI(41; 42) = pE(41; 42) = 0. Since we
know that pI(a1; a2) and p

E(a1; a2) is the unique intersection point of p
D
I (a1; pE) and
pDE (a2; pI), p
S
I (pE) and p
S
E(pI) as well as p
M
I (a1), p
M
E (a2) can not be part of the equilib-
rium for a1 2 [31; 0] and a2 2 [0; 32]. Hence p^I(41; pE) and p^E(42; pI) cross only at at
(0,0). This also implies that the only possible equilibrium is pI = p

E = 0. Notice that for
every a1  41, (0,0) is part of the best response for I. The same is true for a2  42 and
E's best response, which proves the proposition. 
Proposition A.3.3. Suppose 0  a1  41 and a2  1 + c(1 + ) + 2
 
1  c+ a1

. Then
the equilibrium prices are given by
pI = p
D
I (a1; 0) and p

E = 0
Proof. Notice that the restrictions in proposition A.3.3 imply a2 > 
4
2, which is to say
that 0(a2)  0. For a1  41, pDI (a1; 0)  0. Hence there are two possible situations,
either pDI (a1; 0)  0(a2) or pDI (a1; 0)  0(a2). It is easy to see that
pDI (a1; 0)  0(a2) , a2  1 + c(1 + ) +

2
 
1  c + a1

Moreover, by lemma A.3.2 and A.3.3 we know that pDI (a1; pE) is the only branch, where
an equilibrium could occur. Notice that
@pDE
@pI
 1
>

@pSE
@pI
 1
>
@pDI
@pE
:
Together with the restrictions on a1 and a2 this implies that p
D
I (a1; pE) < p^
 1
E (a1; pE)
for 0 < pE  E(a1). At pE = 0, pDI (a1; 0) > 0. Furthermore, p^E(a2; pI) = 0 for
0  pI  0(a2). Hence the unique equilibrium is given by
pI = p
D
I (a1; 0) and p

E = 0 
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Proposition A.3.4. Suppose 0  a1  41 and 42  a2 < 1 + c(1 + ) + 2
 
1  c + a1

.
Then the equilibrium prices are given by
pI = p

I(a1; a2) and p

E = p

E(a1; a2)
Proof. Notice that the parameter restrictions of proposition A.3.4 satisfy (A.3.18)
and (A.3.19), hence pI(a1; a2) > 0 and p

E(a1; a2) > 0. Hence a potential equilibrium is
pI = p

I(a1; a2) and p

E = p

E(a1; a2). However, it remains to be veried, whether this is
always in I and E's feasible set, i.e. element of either best response curve.
It is easy to verify that 0  pE(a1; a2)  E(a1) for all a1  0 and 0  a2. By
denition, pI(a1; a2) > p
D
I (a1; 0) > 0(a2). Furthermore, 1(a2)  1 as well as 2(a2) > 1.
However notice that
pI(a1; a2) > 1 , a2 <
 2 + (1 + ) + c(4  ) + 2a1

= a2(a1)
Moreover it is easy to see that pI(a1; a2) is increasing in a1. Hence if a2(a1) > a2 is
satised for a1 = 0, we know that it is also satised for all a1 < 0. Simple algebra shows
that a2(0) < 
4
2. We can therefore conclude that for 
4
2  a2 < 1+c(1+)+ 2
 
1 c+a1

,
pI(a1; a2) is indeed an equilibrium.
Notice that pI = p

I(a1; a2) and p

Ep

E(a1; a2) is a unique equilibrium. p
D
I (a1; pE) is
the only relevant part of I's best response curve. Furthermore it is increasing in pE and
pDE (a2; 1(a2)) > 0 as well as p
D
E (a2; 1(a2)) > p
M
E (a2), which rules out any other possible
intersection points of the best response functions. 
Proposition A.3.5. Suppose 0  a2  42 and a1   1   2c   2
 
1   c + a1

. Then the
equilibrium prices are given by
pI = 0 and p

E = p
D
E (a2; 0)
Proof. It is easy to see that 0  a2  42 and a1   1   2c   2
 
1   c + a1

imply
a1 < 
4
1. Hence 0(a1) > 0, moreover, 0(a1)  pDE (a2; 0). Notice that because of lemmas
A.3.2 and A.3.3, only pDE (a2; pI) is relevant for nding an equilibrium. However since
@pDI
@pE
 1
>

@pSI
@pE
 1
>
@pDE
@pI
:
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Together with the restrictions on a1 and a2 this implies that p
D
E (a2; pI) < p^
 1
I (a2; pE)
for 0 < pI  I(a2). However notice that for pE 2 [0; 0(a1)], p^I(a1; pE) = 0. Since
pDE (a2; pI) 2 [0; 0(a1)], we can conclude that the unique equilibrium is given by
pI = 0and p

E = p
D
E (a2; 0) 
Proposition A.3.6. Suppose 0  a2  42 and 41  a1 >  1  2c  2
 
1  c+ a1

. Then
the equilibrium prices are given by
pI = p

I(a1; a2) and p

E = p

E(a1; a2)
Proof. Since 0  a2  42 and 41  a1 >  1   2c   2
 
1   c + a1

satisfy (A.3.18)
and (A.3.19), a possible candidate equilibrium is pI = p

I(a1; a2) and p

E = p

E(a1; a2).
Notice that if this point is feasible, i.e. on both best response functions of I and E,
it is also unique. pSI (pE) and p
S
E(pI) cannot be part of an equilibrium . Furthermore,
pDI (a1; 1(a1)  0 for 11  a1  21 and pDI (a1; 2(a1))  pMI (a1) for 21  a1  31.
Because pDE (a2; pI) is increasing in pI , p

I = p

I(a1; a2) and p

E = p

E(a1; a2) is the only
point of intersection with p^I(a1; pE), if it is feasible.
By denition, 0(a1) < p
D
E (a2; 0). Because
@pDI
@pE
<

@pDE
@pI
 1
, pDE (a2; 0) < p

E(a1; a2).
Moreover notice that 1(a1)  1 as well as 2(a1). But
pE(a1; a2) > 1 , a1 >
2  ( + 1)(2c+ ) + 2a2 + c2

= a1(a2)
It is easy to verify that
pE
@a2
< 0, hence it is sucient to check for a2 = 0. Simple algebra
shows that
a1(0) =
2  ( + 1)(2c+ ) + c2

> 41
Hence, pE(a1; a2) > 1 is only satised for a1 > a1(a2) > 
4
1. Hence p

E(a1; a2) is always
feasible. It is also easy to see that 0  pI(a1; a2)  I(a2) for all a2  0 and a1  0.
Therefore, pI = p

I(a1; a2) and p

E = p

E(a1; a2) is the unique equilibrium. 
1st Stage
After having identied all possible equilibria in the pricing stage, given a1 and a2, we
can now turn to the rst stage and look at the optimal choice of a1 and a2. Notice that
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proposition A.3.1 to A.3.6 divide (a1; a2)-space into four mutually exclusive sets. The
following lemma identies the subset that turns out relevant for identifying the optimal
choice of a1 and a2.
Lemma A.3.4. The optimal fa1; a2g 2 K1 with
K1 =

fa1; a2gja2 < 1 + c(1 + ) + 
2
 
1  c + a1
 ^ a1 >  1  2c  
2
 
1  c+ a1

Proof. Depending on a1 and a2, four dierent equilibria in the pricing game are
possible. This allows us to subdivide (a1; a2)-space into four mutually exclusive sets. The
following relationships hold.
fa1; a2g 2 K1 , pI = pI(a1; a2) pE = pE(a1; a2)
fa1; a2g 2 K2 , pI = pDI (a1; 0) pE = 0
fa1; a2g 2 K3 , pI = 0 pE = 0
fa1; a2g 2 K4 , pI = 0 pE = pDE (a2; 0)
with
K1 =

fa1; a2gja2 < 1 + c(1 + ) + 
2
 
1  c + a1
 ^ a1 >  1  2c  
2
 
1  c+ a1

K2 =

fa1; a2gja2 < 1 + c(1 + ) + 
2
 
1  c + a1
 ^ a1 > 41
K3 =

fa1; a2gja2  42 ^ a1  41

K4 =

fa1; a2gja2 < 42 ^ a1 >  1  2c 

2
 
1  c+ a1

The allocation of pricing equilibria to dierent subsets in (a1; a2)-space has implications on
the prot functions of I and E. The choice variables of the rms are a1 and a2, however,
their prots are not always dependent on both of them. Consider fa1; a2g 2 K3. Since the
optimal prices for either I or E are zero, prots are independent of a1 and a2, i.e. they
are constants. It is easy to verify that these are given by
3I =  3c and 3E =  c
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for fa1; a2g 2 K3. For fa1; a2g 2 K2, prots are given by
2I(a1) = (p
D
I (a1; 0)  2c)qI
 
pDI (a1; 0); 0
  cqE pDI (a1; 0); 0+ a1pDI (a1; 0)
2E(a1) =  cqE
 
pDI (a1; 0); 0
  a1pDI (a1; 0):
It is important to realize that both I and E's prot turn out to be independent of a2,
hence I perceives his prot as being constant in stage 1.
Consider fa1; a2g 2 K4. The corresponding price equilibrium alters perceived prots
in the rst stage to
4I(a2) =  2cqI
 
0; pDE (a2; 0)
  cqE 0; pDE (a2; 0)+ a2pDE (a2; 0)
4E(a2) = (p
D
E (a2; 0)  c)qE
 
0; pDE (a2; 0)
  a2pDE (a2; 0):
Because both prots are independent of a1, E's choice on a1 is irrelevant. Finally for
fa1; a2g 2 K1, prots are both dependent on a1 and a2.
1I(a1; a2) = (p

I(a1; a2)  2c)qI
 
pI(a1; a2); p

E(a1; a2)
  cqE pI(a1; a2); pE(a1; a2)+
+a1p

I(a1; a2) + a2p

E(a1; a2)
1E(a1; a2) = (p

E(a1; a2)  c)qE
 
pI(a1; a2); p

E(a1; a2)
  a1pI(a1; a2)  a2pE(a1; a2):
To sum up, I perceives his prots to be constant for fa1; a2g 2 K3 [ K4. E's prots
are constant for fa1; a2g 2 K3 [ K2. Notice that by choosing a2, I is able to move from
K3 to K4 and from K2 to K1. E on the other hand picks a1, hence it could move from K3
to K2 and from K4 to K1.
Consider rm I's choice of a2 and x a1 < 
4
1. That means that at the margin, I
chooses between K3 and K4. His prots are given by 3I and 4I(a2), with 4I(42) = 3I .
Hence if
@4I
@a2

a2=42
< 0, I always prefersK4 toK3. It is easy to verify that
@4I
@a2
= c+12 a2,
which is certainly negative for a2 = 
4
2. Hence I's optimal choice of a2 is never in K4.
Now let us x a1  41. By choosing a2, I chooses between K2 and K1. Notice that
for a2 = 1 + c(1 + ) +

2
 
1   c + a1

, 1I(a1; a2) = 
2
I(a1). If
@4I
@a2
< 0 for a1  41 and
a2 = 1+ c(1+)+

2
 
1  c+a1

, we can conclude that I prefers being in K1 rather than
in K2. It is straightforward to verify that
@4I
@a2
< 0 , a2 > c+ (c
2   4)(2  2) + 3(a1 + 1)
2(32   8) = 2(a1)
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It is easy to see that 2(a1) < 1 + c(1 + ) +

2
 
1  c + a1

for a1  41. Hence, @
4
I
@a2
< 0
is indeed satised for a1  41 and a2 = 1 + c(1 + ) + 2
 
1   c + a1

. Hence we can
conclude that I prefers K1 to K2.
Firm E decides upon a1. If we x a2 > 
4
2, E chooses between K3 and K2 by picking
a1, with prots being 
3
E and 
2
E(a1) respectively. Notice that 
2
E(
4
1) = 
3
E . Since
@2E
@a1
=  (12 + a1+ c), which is positive for a1 = 41, E prefers being in K2 rather than K3.
Now x a2  42. Picking a1 amounts to choosing between K4 and K1, with prots
given by 4E(a2) and 
1
E(a1; a2) respectively. For a1 =  1  2c  2
 
1  c+ a1

, 4E(a2) =
1E(a1; a2). If E prefers K1 to K4, we need to have
@1E
@a1
> 0 for a1 =  1 2c  2
 
1 c+a1

and a2  42. Simple algebra shows that
@1E
@a1
> 0 , a1 < 4(1 + 2c)(2  
2) + 3(a2 + c  1)
2(22   8) = 1(a2)
It is straightforward to see that 1(a2) >  1  2c  2
 
1  c+ a1

for a2  42.
Summing up the ndings, we have the following 'preferences' of I and E:
I: K4  K3 and K1  K2
E: K2  K3 and K1  K4
Notice that these orderings imply that K1 is the only set that survives. That means that
any equilibrium in a1 and a2 necessarily has to lie in K1. 
Lemma A.3.4 suggests that for nding an equilibrium, we can restrict ourselves to
looking at 1I(a1; a2) and 
1
E(a1; a2) only. Notice that the best response function for a1
and a2 are given by a

1 = 1(a2) and a

2 = 2(a1) respectively.
Proposition A.3.7. The unique equilibrium in the rst stage of the game is given by
a1 =
3c  2   22c  2   4c+ 4 + 8c
2 + 4   8 (A.3.22)
a2 =
 8c+ 52c  4 + 2 + 2
2 + 4   8 (A.3.23)
Proof. Notice that 1(a2) and 2(a1) are both linear functions in a1 and a2. Therefore,
the system of equation a1 = 1(a2) and a2 = 2(a1) have a unique solution. Simple algebra
shows that this is given by (A.3.22) and (A.3.23). Furthermore, it is easy to verify that
41  a1  0 and 0  a2  42. That means that fa1; a2g 2 K1. 
AN INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT 85
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Substituting (A.3.22) and (A.3.23) into (3.7) and (3.8), we get
the symmetric price
p =
2(2c   2c  1)
(2 + 4   8) :
Because of (3.17),
pIa(c)  p =
(2 + 2   4) + 2c(32   2   4)
(2  )(2 + 4   8) (A.3.24)
Note that for all  2]0; 1[, the denominator is negative. Both terms in brackets in the
numerator are negative for all  2]0; 1[, which makes (A.3.24) over all positive. This proves
the rst statement of the proposition.
To prove that welfare is higher under the fa1; a2g-mechanism, consider total surplus
given by
TS = U(qI ; qE) + (i +E)
with U(qI ; qE) given in (??). Rewriting U(qI ; qE) in terms of prices, taking the derivative
with respect to pI and evaluating this at a symmetric equilibrium yields
@TS
@pI

pI=pE=p
=
2c(1  2)  p(1  3) + 2
1 + 
:
Note that total surplus is decreasing in p, hence because of the rst part of proposition
3.2 the claim is proved.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. To proof lemma 3.1, we have to solve the maximization program
(3.20). Notice that the indirect utility function is given by:
U(pI ; pE) =

2(1   (pI+pE)
2  (1  pI)
2
2(1  )  
(1  pE)2
2(1  ) +

1   (pI+pIpE+pE) (A.3.25)
L = U(pI ; pE) + l(I +2) (A.3.26)
Dierentiating w.r.t. pI , pE and l and dividing
@L
@pI
= 0 by @L@pE = 0 eliminates l. The
optimal Ramsey prices have to solve the two equations
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qI(pI ; pE)
qE(pI ; pE)
=
qI(pI ; pE) + (pI   2c) @qI@pI + (pE   2c)
@qE
@pI
qE(pI ; pE) + (pI   2c) @qI@pE + (pE   2c)
@qE
@pE
(A.3.27)
I +E = 0 (A.3.28)
where the l.h.s. of (A.3.27) is due to Roy's identity. Note that these are two quadratic
formulae. Solving (A.3.28) for pI , gives two solutions. We take the smaller of the two
25,
which is given by
pRI (pE) =
1
2
+ c+ (pE   c)  D1
2
(A.3.29)
where
D1 = (2(pE   c) + 1)2   4(f1 + f2)  4pE(pE   2c  1)  4c(3  c(1  2)) (A.3.30)
Notice that pRI (pE) 2 R i D1  0. This is true as long as
pE 2

1
2(1  ) + c 
pD2
2(1  2) ;
1
2(1  ) + c+
pD2
2(1  2)

with
D2 = 2(1 + )
 
(1  2c(1  ))2   2(f1 + f2)(1  )
Substituting pRI (pE) in (A.3.27) and solving for pE yields two solutions, The smaller
one is the optimal symmetric Ramsey price given by:
p R =
1  2c(1  ) pD3
2(1  ) (A.3.31)
where
D3 = D2
2(1 + )
Hence, whenever D2  0 there exists a symmetric Ramsey price given by p R Note that
D2  0 implies
(1  2c(1  ))2
1    2(fI + fE)
which proves the result.
25 Note that the Ramsey price has to be smaller than the multiproduct monopolist solution.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. Consider the function dierence
(c; ; F ) = pI   pR =
pD3
2(1  )  
(4  2)(1  2c(1  ))
(8  (4 + ))(1  )
The proposition is proved by dierentiation of the expression with respect to the three
parameters, evaluated at (c; ; F ) = 0. Note that the latter condition implies
p
D3 = 2(4  
2)(1  2c(1  ))
8  (4 + ) (A.3.32)
Dene
1 =
pD3
2(1  )
2 =  (4  
2)(1  2c(1  ))
(8  (4 + ))(1  )
hence (c; ; F ) = 1 + 2
i. Dierentiation w.r.t. : Note that
@1
@
=
F + 2c(1  2c(1  ))
2(1  )pD3
 0
and
@2
@
=
>0z }| {
1
2(8  (4 + ))(1  )
 >0z }| {
2(1 + 2c(1  )) +
>0z }| {
2c(4  2) +
+ (4  2)(1 + 2c(1  ))| {z }
>0
(2 + 4)(1  ) + (8  (4 + ))
(8  (4 + ))(1  )| {z }
>0

> 0
for  2 [0; 1] and c 2 [0; 1=2]. Hence, case (i.) of proposition 3.3 is proved.
ii. Dierentiation w.r.t. c: Because
@1
@c
=  1  2c(1  )pD3
 0
and
@2
@
=   4  
2
8  (4 + ) < 0
for  2 [0; 1] and c 2 [0; 1=2], c > c ) (c; ; F ) < 0.
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iii. Dierentiation w.r.t. F : It is easy to see that
@1
@F
=   1pD3
< 0
and
@2
@
= 0
for  2 [0; 1] and c 2 [0; 1=2]. Hence case (iii.) of proposition 3.3 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. The proof of proposition 4.3 follows immediately from the proof
of proposition 3.2.
Chapter 4
Utility vs. Fixed Fee Competition
and Interconnection Pricing
4.1 Introduction
Deregulation and technological progress have changed the telecommunications industry
tremendously over the past two decades. Due to innovation in data transmission new
players such as cable television companies are able to oer telecommunications services
using their own network. As new services such as Voice over IP, video on demand etc.
were technologically feasible, pricing schemes became much more involved and rms came
up with more and more ornate tari structures.
Up to this date, the regulation of interconnection charges remains the single most
important policy question regulatory authorities have to answer in network industries.
Starting with the pioneering work of Laont et al. (1998a,b) and Armstrong (1998),
interconnection pricing1 has been identied to be a potential threat to competition. In
particular, Gans and King (2001) suggest that with two-part taris and network-based
price discrimination, access charges below marginal cost are used to soften competition,
increase rms' prots and decrease overall welfare. In that case using more involved retail
pricing schemes results in bad overall outcomes.
1Interconnection price or access charge is the payment from one network to another, in order to com-
pensate the originating or terminating network for delivering the call to the receiver.
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In this paper we employ a version of a two-part tari to a model of two-way network
interconnection introduced by Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) and Gans and King (2001).
Two networks are horizontally dierentiated and are able to price discriminate between
on-net and o-net calls. However instead of charging a xed fee to consumers, rms oer
a net utility level ex-ante. Once market shares and overall call volumes2 are realized,
the xed fee is computed ex post by means of a predetermined formula. This uses the
announced utility levels, usage prices and market shares and is nothing but the inverse of
the net surplus function which simply selects a price to equate realized and oered indirect
utilities. Thus, information on the demand and indirect utility function is necessary to
implement such a formula.
The paper shows that this retail price mechanism evaporates any collusive tendencies
of the access charge. In equilibrium, rms price access exactly at cost and welfare is
increased as compared to the \traditional" two-part tari. Hence overall xed fees and
hence net-utility levels dier for both pricing regimes. We show that this dierence is
reminiscent of dierences in Cournot and Bertrand prices and quanities in dierentiated
products markets. Singh and Vives (1984) and Cheng (1985) show that by committing to
quantity competition, duopoly mark-ups are lager due to a decreased elasticity of demand
as compared to Bertrand pricing. The same happens in the present setup. Committing to
subscription fee competition allows rms to decrease the elasticity of subscription demand
by lowering the access charge. Hence in equilibrium, the access price and per-unit o-net
prices are distorted with subscription fee competition and welfare is lower than with utility
based competition.
Furthermore we use a graphical argument in line with Cheng (1985) to show that
subscription fee contracts dominate competition in utility space.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we introduce the model and briey
review the results obtained by Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) and Gans and King (2001).
Section 4.3 derives the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome with utility competition. In
section 4.4 we compare our results to the literature and derive an endogenous contract.
Section 4.5 concludes and discusses the relevance of the approach.
2It is straightforward to apply our analysis to other network industries such as utility, railway or postal
industries. However for the remainder of the paper, we have the telecommunications industry in mind.
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4.2 The Model
We use the framework of Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) thus allow destination based
price discrimination and non-linear taris.
 Cost structure: There are two networks 1 and 2, located on each end of a unit
line. Both rms incur the same xed cost f of providing service to a consumer. Marginal
cost of providing a call consists of the cost of physically transporting data (c0) and the
cost of switching/routing the call (c1). c0 is incurred twice, since the call is transported
from the caller to the switch and from thereon to the receiver, hence marginal cost of
providing a call amount to c = 2c0 + c1.
 Demand structure: In order to be as general as possible, we do not assume
a specic model of demand formation. However, we restrict our attention to settings
where markets are covered. Let i denote the market share of (demand for) network i,
then j = 1   i. Empirically this assumption seems to be reasonable for the case of
telecommunication industries. Nearly every household already has a telephone, if not also
a mobile set. This naturally implies that a decrease in the demand of network i is exactly
oset by an increase in the demand of network j.
We assume that rms exhibit market power hence
@i(wi; wj)
@wi
= (wi; wj) < 0
where wi denotes the net surplus of being attached to network i 2 f1; 2g. This derivative
measures the mark up a rm is able to achieve because of its market power.
Set aside preferences for each specic networks, consumers are homogeneous with re-
spect to calling patterns. This implies that there are no dierent types of users such as
high or low users. In line with Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) the net-utility of making
calls is given by v(p) = maxq u(q)  pq, i.e. given a price for an outgoing call, a consumer
picks the length of his call q in order to maximize his utility3.
Furthermore, we assume balanced calling patterns, that is, every customer is equally
likely to be called by everyone. It implies that the probability of a call terminating at
either of the two networks is equal to its market share. Price discrimination between on-
net and o-net calls and the behavioral assumptions imply net surplus functions for being
3We assume no income eects,hence v0(p) =  q(p).
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attached to rm 1 and 2 given by
w1 = v(p1) + (1  )v(p12)  F1 (4.1)
w2 = (1  )v(p2) + v(p21)  F2 (4.2)
where F1 (F2) denotes the subscription fee to be paid by consumers to rm 1 (2). The
market share of rm 1 is denoted by  and, because markets are covered, rm 2 is left
with a market share of 1  .
 Access pricing: Like most of the literature on two-way access pricing, we assume
linear per-unit prices a. These are paid by the originating network to the terminating
network4. Another assumption which is often suggested by regulatory authorities is the
reciprocity of access charge. This assures that both networks pay the same price for
transporting the same amount of trac.
 Retail market competition: The paper proposes a particular retail price mech-
anism. As opposed to a regular two-part tari, where rms charge a subscription fee
and per-unit-prices, we require rm i to announce a utility level wi which they want to
deliver to consumers and per-unit prices. Once these are announced and market shares
are realized, subscription fees are determined ex post. These are computed according to
the formula of the inverse of the net surplus function which is given by
Fi = iv(pi) + jv(pij)  wi: (4.3)
Equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) show the dichotomy between wi and Fi. The equations
constitute a demand framework similar to the traditional price/quantity relationship.
We allow rms to price discriminate between on-net (pi) and o-net (pij) calls. The
prot function of rm i is given by
i = (Fi   f)i + 2i (pi   c)q(pi) + ij(pij   c)q(pij) (4.4)
+ijmc
 
q(pji)  q(pij)

;
where m = a c0c is dened as the access mark up relative to total marginal cost. The rst
term represents the prots due to subscription fees, the second and third terms represent
prots from on-net and o-net calls, respectively. The last term denotes the access decit.
4Observe that a could be negative. In that case the direction of the payment changes.
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Whenever m > 0 (m < 0), it is positive (negative) if rm j transfers more trac to
network i than it receives.
 The timing of the game: The strategic interaction is modeled by a two stage
game. In stage 1, rms negotiate an interconnection price. Given this access charge, rms
compete in stage two by oering the preferred level of overall utility and per-unit retail
prices. Then consumers make subscription decisions after which the subscription fees are
determined using (4.3).
4.3 Analysis
4.3.1 Competition in utility space
In this section we analyze the equilibrium outcome of the market game, given access charge
a. That is, rms maximize their prots by choosing an optimal two part tari consisting
of per-unit retail prices and utility levels. It is instructive to rewrite (4.4) using (4.1) and
(4.2), yielding
i = (iv(pi) + jv(pij)  wi   f)i + 2i (pi   c)q(pi) (4.5)
+ij(pij   c)q(pij) + ijmc
 
q(pji)  q(pij)

;
Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) and Gans and King (2001) show that marginal on- and
o-net prices equal (perceived) marginal cost of c and (1+m)c respectively. A symmetric
equilibrium is characterized by the rst order conditions of both rms' prot functions
with respect to wi:
di
dwi
=
@i(wi; wj)
@wi

i
 
mcq((1 +m)c) + v(c)

+ jv((1 +m)c)  w1   f

+i

@i
@wi
 
mcq((1 +m)c) + v(c)

+
@j
@wi
v((1 +m)c)  1

(4.6)
Applying market coverage ( @i@wi =  
@j
@wi
) and symmetry (i = j =
1
2) we are left with
di
dwi
=
@i
@wi
(v(c)  wi   f)  1
2
(4.7)
The results can be summarized by Proposition 4.1:
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Proposition 4.1. Suppose two networks A and B oer a tari which consists of two
prices for on-net and o-net trac (pi and pij respectively) and an overall utility level wi.
Additionally an ex post payment Fi from consumers to rm i is determined by (4.3). If
an equilibrium is characterized by the rst-order conditions, this will be given by
i. per-unit prices that are determined by
pi = c;
pij = (1 +m)c:
ii. an overall utility level given by w = v(c)  f   12(w;w)
iii. the corresponding subscription fee for consumers is given by
F i =
1
2
(v((1 +m)c)  v(c)) + f + 1
2(w; w)
:
Proof: See appendix.
Part [i.] of Proposition 4.1 is a well known result which is common to most of the
two-part tari literature and it holds in our case as well. It simply states that usage prices
are set equal to the perceived marginal cost of the operator. Part [ii.] characterizes the
equilibrium utility level that is oered by the rms. In equilibrium, each rm oers utility
independent of the access price | i.e. as if a consumer's calls are entirely on-net | net
of the xed cost incurred by the rm for connecting a single consumer and the mark-up
that results from the sensitivity of market share with respect to net-utility levels. The
assumption that , the sensitivity of own market share with respect to the oered net-
utility level is independent of wi in a symmetric equilibrium drives this result. It is easy to
see in the appendix, that this allows us to solve for the symmetric equilibrium net utility.
Part [iii.] of proposition 4.1 states the equilibrium subscription fee that is determined
after the market shares are resolved. Its components are the x cost of connection, the
mark-up, and half of the loss (gain) of gross consumer surplus due to an access charge
above (below) marginal cost.
There are two things to recognize in this proposition: rstly, agreed upon access charges
do not enter the announced utility levels. Losses or gains in consumer surpluses due to
above or below marginal cost pricing are fully incorporated by rms through adjusting of
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the subscription fee after the game has been played. It only enters the rms' oers via
equilibrium o-net prices. Secondly, the rm is oering utility as if a consumer's calls
are all on-net, i.e. priced at marginal cost c. Hence the distribution of market shares is
not relevant for equilibrium net-utility levels. All asymmetries due to access charges and
dierences in market shares are accounted for ex post via the subscription fee which is
derived from the inverse net surplus formula.
To compare our general result with the existing literature, we employ a Hotelling
demand function that is frequently used in models of two-way interconnection.
If we adopt the Hotelling formulation applied in Laont et al (1998b) and Gans and
King (2001), the market share function is given by
i(wi; wj) =
1
2
+ (wi   wj)
and the derivative thereof reduces to
di
dwi
=  (4.8)
Hence we can state the following:
Corollary 4.1. If market share result from a Hotelling model, then if either  is su-
ciently small or a is close to c0, the equilibrium net-utility level is given by
w = v(c)  f   1
2
(4.9)
where per-unit prices remain as in Proposition 4.1. The ex post subscription fee is given
by
F i =
1
2
(v((1 +m)c)  v(c)) + f + 1
2
:
Proof: See appendix.
4.3.2 Determination of the access charge
Let us now turn to the rst stage of the game, and derive the optimal access charge,
i.e. joint prot maximizing level of access charge, given the retail market outcome. The
interconnection price is negotiated cooperatively. The existing literature suggests that the
access charge acts as a collusive device. We show that this is not the case if rms compete
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in net-utility levels and prices. In order to do so, let us rewrite (4.5) taking into account
the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage given the access charge.
i =
1
4

1
@i(wi;wj)
@wi
  (v(c)  v((1 +m)c)) +mcq((1 +m)c)

: (4.10)
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that rms oer a tari consisting of dierent o-net and on-
net per-unit prices pi and p

ij and an overall utility level w
. Then, if market is covered
and
@i(wi;wj)
@wi
is independent of the access charge, the unique equilibrium access charge is
chosen such that a = c0, hence m = 0.
Proof: See appendix.
Since the optimal access mark-up is zero in equilibrium, rms' perceived marginal cost
equal their actual marginal cost and o-net prices are not distorted. From (4.10), we
can identify three distinct eects on i's prot function of increasing m by an innitesimal
amount. First of all, it decreases the utility consumers derive from o-net calls and
therefore decreases the subscription fee paid ex-post. This is exactly oset by a direct
change of revenues due to the access price increase. At the same time, there is an indirect
eect on access revenues because increasing the access charge decreases demand.
Since consumers' equilibrium utility level is independent of the access mark-up, rms
fully incorporate changes of consumer surplus through changes in (ex-post) subscription
fees. In the absence of income eects, these changes in surplus are oset by direct changes
in access revenue due to an increase of the access mark-up. Thus, the only term we are left
with is the change in prots due to the demand response to an increase in access charges.
Marginal prots in this case can be set to zero by setting access price at cost of providing
access. Hence, there are no incentives to distort the o-net cost prices, by taking away
consumers' net-utility.
This is a very appealing result, since it suggests an ecient market outcome in the
sense that rms price at marginal cost. It is resulting from the fact that rms are the
only market agents who exhibit gains and losses from varying the access charge. This is a
crucial dierence to the models introduced by Laont et al. (1998b) and Gans and King
(2001). The next section provides an intuition for this dierence.
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4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Dierences in competition with utilities and at fees
Since retail prices reect (perceived) marginal cost, the dierence in outcomes stems from
the determination of subscription fees/net-utility levels. Using contracts based on sub-
scription fees as in Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) and Gans and King (2001) we obtain
F F = f +
1
2
 

v(c)  v((1 +m)c)

(4.11)
wF =
3
2
v(c)  1
2
v((1 +m)c)  f   1
2
(4.12)
where the subscript F denotes the solutions in the case of competition in subscription fees.
Taking dierences between the results from proposition 4.1 we obtain
F    F F =
1
2
(v(c)  v((1 +m)c) =  (w   wF ): (4.13)
This dierence is zero for m = 0,5 i.e. both results coincide for m = 0. For m < 0 |
the equilibrium access markup obtained in Gans and King (2001) | net-utility supplied
to consumers is higher in the case of utility based competition. The reverse result hold
true for subscription fees. It is apparent from (4.12) that net-utility is not independent
of the access charge. As we shall see, this has immediate welfare implications for both
mechanisms.
If we want to compare both pricing regimes, we know that independent of whether
rms compete in prices or utilities, marginal prices, i.e. pi and pij are the same across
both approaches. Thus, we can x per-unit prices at their equilibrium values. Recall rm
i's prot is given by
i = i(Fi   f) + i(j)mcq((1 +m)c) (4.14)
where i denotes the market share of network i and
Fi = iv(c) + jv((1 +m)c)  wi:
Each rm's conjecture on the competitor's strategic behavior determines the duopoly
outcome6. However, once rm j commits to a strategic variable and xes his conjectures
5We are assuming identical access markups in both cases for this comparison.
6This point has been stressed in the literature on Bertrand vs. Cournot competition by Singh and Vives
(1984) and Cheng (1985). See also Kamien and Schwartz (1983) and Grossman (1981).
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about rm i's strategic variable, rm i is monopolist over his residual subscription de-
mand. Therefore maximizing i's prot with respect to wi and Fi is equivalent, once its
competitors' conjectures are xed.
Suppose rm i picks wi, his rst-order condition after simplications, can be written
as 
2iv(c) + (1  2i)
 
v((1 +m)c) + cmq((1 +m)c)
  wi   fdi
dwi
  i = 0: (4.15)
Both competition in net-utilities and xed fees ultimately result in a symmetric equilib-
rium, hence i = 1=2. Solving (4.15) for wi at i = 1=2 yields
wi = v(c)  f   1
2 didwi
: (4.16)
Firm j's conjectures on competition enter this expression via the total dierential of
i. If rm j commits to competing in xed fees, it is equivalent to saying rm j commits
to a utility rule wj(Fj ; wi). Since, given Fj and the denition of i and j , wj could be
computed by solving
Fj = (
1
2
+ (wj   wi))v(c) + (1
2
  (wj   wi))v((1 +m)c)  wj ;
yielding
wj(Fj ; wi) =
1


(  1)wi   Fj + 1
2
(v(c) + v((1 +m)c))

: (4.17)
with  = 1  (v(c)  v((1 +m)c)). Therefore,
d
dwi
i(wi; wj(Fj ; wi)) =     @
@wi
wj(Fj ; wi)
=

1    1



=

1  (v(c)  v((1 +m)c)) : (4.18)
Substituting (4.18) in (4.16) yields exactly (4.12).
Notice that (4.18) equals  whenm = 0, is smaller than  ifm < 0 and larger otherwise.
Thus, if both rms commit to competing in subscription fees, they are able to decrease the
elasticity of subscription demand by choosing m < 0. Hence, at the optimal access charge,
characterized in Gans and King (2001), each rm faces a less elastic residual subscription
demand. By decreasing the access charge, rms reduce the sensitivity of the subscription
UTILITY VS. FIXED FEE 99
demand to utility levels. In doing so, they oer a higher value for o-net calls, however this
increase in surplus is more than o-set by an increase in the subscription fee. If consumers'
net-utility depends on the access charge, rms have an instrument for extracting surplus
from the consumers.
4.4.2 Welfare Analysis
Overall welfare eects are, at rst glance, ambiguous. Below cost pricing of o-net calls
leads to losses and consumption of on-and-o-net calls are unambiguously distorted at the
level of access charges characterized in Gans and King (2001). Hence with rms picking
subscription fees, welfare is not at its optimal level.
Suppose a regulator wants to implement a benevolent social planner's choice and reg-
ulate market outcomes in order to maximize total surplus. In our analysis the benevolent
dictator simply picks an access charge in the rst stage and competition takes place in
the second stage. Therefore there are two dierent situations, one with utility based and
one with xed fee competition in stage two. Hence, we can make use of the results of the
preceding analysis. Consumer surplus is given by
CS = iwi + jwj   T
where T denotes the average disutility of not being subscribed to his preferred network
with T = t(2 + (1  )2)=2. Total surplus is then given by
W = CS + i + j (4.19)
Let us rst look at the case of utility based competition. Given the equilibrium of the
retail market game, we have
Wutil = CS + i + j
= w   1
4
+
1
2

1  (v(c)  v((1 +m)c))+ 1
2
mcq((1 +m)c)
=
1
2

v(c) + v(1 +m)c) +mcq((1 +m)c)

  f   1
4
: (4.20)
Notice that we already made use of the fact that the equilibrium is symmetric. w is given
by Proposition 4.1. The task for the social planner is to pick the access charge in order
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to maximize (4.20). Notice, however, that this is equivalent to the rms problem if they
choose the prot maximizing access charge, since neither w nor 14 is a function of the
access charge. Therefore we can state the following proposition
Proposition 4.3. Suppose rms are oering taris consisting of an overall utility level
and per-unit charges. Then the prot maximizing access charge chosen by the rms is also
socially ecient.
Suppose that rms commit to competing in subscription fees. Taking into account
(4.5), (4.11), (4.12) and the symmetry of the equilibrium, we can rewrite (4.3) as
Wfix = CS + i + j
=
3
2
v(c)  1
2
v((1 +m)c)  f   1
2
  1
4
+
1
2
  1
2

2

(v(c)  v((1 +m)c)

 mcq((1 +m)c)

=
1
2

v(c) + v(1 +m)c) +mcq((1 +m)c)

  f   1
4
: (4.21)
Observe that (4.20) and (4.21) are equal for the same m, hence their optimum is identical,
namely m = 0. For any value of m social welfare is lower than at m = 0. However, Gans
and King (2001) show that rms choose m < 0 in equilibrium if contracts are based on
subscription fees. Thus, if rms compete in utilities the access charge is set at marginal
cost, leaving per-unit prices undistorted and rms with Hotelling mark-ups.
Let us compare a rm's decision problem with both utility and subscription fee based
competition. Dierentiating a consumer's equilibrium net-utility of subscribing to network
i with respect to m yields
@w
@m
=
1
2
@v((1 +m)c)
@m
  @F

@m
With utility based competition, the l.h.s. is zero because of w in proposition 4.1. Hence
1
2
@v((1 +m)c)
@m
=
@F 
@m
:
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Hence, changing m changes equilibrium prots as discussed in section 4.3:
@
@m
=
@
@m

1
2
(F    f) + 1
4
mcq((1 +m)c)

=
1
2
@F 
@m
+
1
4
cq((1 +m)c) +
1
4
mc
@q((1 +m)c)
@m
=
1
4
@v((1 +m)c)
@m
+
1
4
cq((1 +m)c) +
1
4
mc
@q((1 +m)c)
@m
Note that the rst two terms of the last equality cancel out because of Shepard's Lemma.
There is no distortion because the change in gross consumer surplus due to a change in
access charge is fully absorbed by the change in the ex-post subscription fee.
Whenever rms compete in subscription fees the change in net consumer surplus due
to a change in m is given by
@wF
@m
=
1
2
@v((1 +m)c)
@m
  @F

F
@m
:
Taking into account the denition of wF it is easy to see that this results in
@F F
@m
=
1
2
@v((1 +m)c)
@m
+
1
2
@v((1 +m)c)
@m
:
Hence the change in the prot due to a change in m is given by
@F
@m
=
1
2
@F 
@m
+
1
4
cq((1 +m)c) +
1
4
mc
@q((1 +m)c)
@m
=
1
2
@v((1 +m)c)
@m
+
1
4
cq((1 +m)c) +
1
4
mc
@q((1 +m)c)
@m
:
The rst two terms on the r.h.s. are equal to  14q((1+m)c). Hence atm = 0 the reduction
of demand for calls is more than oset by the increase in subscription charge. Hence each
rm has an incentive to distort the prices for o-net calls. Consumers gain from lower
o-net prices, but overall net utility is decreased by an increase in subscription fees.
Summing up, we have seen that for both modes of competition, the welfare maximizing
access charge is equal to marginal cost. However, in an unregulated environment the utility
based mechanism is clearly superior since it implements undistorted per-unit prices. The
result is due to the fact that equilibrium net-utility levels are independent of the access
charge. Hence losses in consumer surplus due to a deviation from cost-based access pricing
are accounted for by rms via an ex-post decrease in the subscription fee. In case of
subscription fee competition consumers have to pay a at payment upfront and adjust
their level of utility accordingly.
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4.4.3 Endogenous Contracts
The preceding sections show that market outcomes and hence welfare is subject to the
rms' choice parameters. This is reminiscent of the duality of Bertrand and Cournot
competition. Singh and Vives (1984) and Cheng (1985) analyzed this issue in detail.
Using a linear demands framework, the former show that with dierentiated products,
price competition is more ecient than quantity competition. Hence Bertrand prices are
lower and subsequently, welfare is higher.
Furthermore Singh and Vives (1984) show that if rms are able to commit to either
price or quantity contracts in a rst stage, using quantities is a dominant strategy for
substitutable products. If products are complements, quantity contracts are strictly dom-
inated.
Coming back to the subject of the present paper, suppose that before rms engage
in competition, they can precommit to either a subscription fee or utility contract. The
question is, which strategy is dominated, if any. In order to answer this, we adopt a
framework similar to Singh and Vives (1984), i.e. the game evolves as follows:
1. Firms decide non-cooperatively and simultaneously which contract to oer, either a
two-part tari with xed fee or net utility level.
2. The access charge is negotiated.
3. Firms engage in retail competition according to their choice in the previous stage.
Both pick a per-unit price and their respective usage independent component.
The game results in a 2  2 payo matrix depicted in gure 4.1. Payos wwi (FFi )
denote rm i's payo if both rms decide to compete in utilities (xed fees), the results
of which are derived in previous section.
Symmetric equilibrium prots are determined by four-tuples given by fw; pi ; pij ;m =
0g for the case of utility competition and fF F ; pi ; pij ;m < 0g for competition in xed fees.
To compute equilibria and graphically discuss results, we use a specic utility function
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Figure 4.1: Two Player Game
analog to the literature7 on two-way interconnection of the form
u(q) =
q
1  1

1  1
 > 1
which yields a constant elasticity demand q = p , an indirect utility function u(p) =

 1p
1  and net-utility of v(p) = 1 1p
1 .
Given the functional assumptions, we can compute the equilibrium prots wwi and
FFi . Using the results of propositions 4.1 and 4.2, computing prots yields
wwi =
1
4
;
the Hotelling prot.
To compute equilibrium prots when both rms commit to xed fee competition, we
have to derive the optimal m, given our functional assumptions. With F F dened by
(4.11) every optimal m has to fulll the necessary condition
c
 
(1 +m)c
 
4(1 +m)

1 +m(1 + )

= 0:
It is easy to see that the unique maximum8 to that equation is given by
mF =  
1
1 + 
< 0:
Symmetric equilibrium prots are given by
FFi =
1
4
+
c1 
4(   1)

1 + 


  2

:
7For example, CED demands are used in Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) and Berger (2002).
8Note that the second order condition is given by
(1+)mc
 
(1+m)c
 
4(1+m)2
. Since  > 1, 1  1
1+
> 0, hence
the second order condition is fullled for m 2]  1; 0] and satises the sucient condition for a maximum.
UTILITY VS. FIXED FEE 104
In equilibrium, FF > ww with m < 0. To show that subscription fee contracts are
dominant for rm 1, we have to show that ww1 < 
Fw
1 and 
wF
1 < 
FF
1 . If 
ww
2 < 
wF
2 and
Fw2 < 
FF
2 is also satised, rm 2's dominant strategy is also competing in subscription
fees. Hence competition in subscription fees is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
To derive the equilibrium of the game in gure 4.1 we use a graphical argument analog
to Cheng (1985). We start with several helpful denitions that allow us to plot subscription
fee equilibria for given m 2]  1; 0] in fw2; w1g-space as in gure 4.2.
Firm i's iso-subscription fee curve Fi(w1; w2) is dened as the line along which rm i
charges the same subscription fee for dierent utility level pairs (w2; w1). Using (4.3) and
applying the implicit function theorem, its slope is given by
dw1
dw2

F1(w)
=
(v((1 +m)c)  v(c))
1 + (v((1 +m)c)  v(c)) : (4.22)
For m 2] 1; 0],  2 [0; 1] and c 2 [0; 1] this is non-negative. It indicates, by which rate
rm 1's has to increase net-utility oered in order to keep his subscription fee constant, if
rm 2 increases his net-utility level by one unit.
The intuition for this is straightforward. Suppose rm 2 increases w2. That means
that customers move from network 2 to 1. Because of balanced calling patterns, that
increases the fraction of calls made o-net. For m  0 v((1 +m)c)  v(c), i.e. any given
o-net call delivers at least as much utility as an o-net call. Hence with more customers
subscribing to network 2, net-utility of being attached to network 1 is non-decreasing with
F1 constant. For m < 0 rm 1's net-utility is actually increasing. Firm 1's iso-subscription
fee curve is therefore upward sloping and has a slope of less than one in fw2; w1g-space. By
the same argument, rm 2's iso-subscription fee curve is also upward sloping and steeper
than its competitors in fw2; w1g-space.
Further more, a rm's iso-subscription fee curve which is closer to the axis represents
a higher subscription fee.
If rms compete in net-utility levels their reaction functions are characterized by their
respective rst-order conditions (4.6). Using the implicit function theorem its slope is
given by
dw1
dw2

Rwi
=
1
2

1 + 2(v((1 +m)c)  v(c)) + 2mcq((1 +m)c)
1 + (v((1 +m)c)  v(c)) + mcq((1 +m)c)

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Figure 4.2: Subscription Fee Equilibrium in Utility Space
For m  0 and c small enough, the slope of best response function is larger than that of
the corresponding iso-subscription fee curve.
Dene rm i's isoprot curve i(b) as the curve in fw2; w1g-space that yields prot b,
i.e. i(b) = fwjw  0; i(w) = bg. It's slope dwidwj

i
for i 6= j is given by  @I=@wj@I=@wi . Note
that,
@i
@wi
=   @i
@wj
   ) dwi
dwj

i
=
@i
@wi
+ 
@i
@wi
(4.23)
for the case of Hotelling. When i cuts i's best response curve, its slope is horizontal in
fw1; w2g-space9. Because of (4.23) i's isoprot curve is upward sloping for w1 < w1(w2)
and downward sloping for w1 > w

1(w2), where w

1(w2) denotes i's best response given w2.
In the absence of cornered markets @i@wj < 0, hence the closer i's isoprot curve to the
wi-axis, the higher the prot.
In gure 4.2 point A depicts an equilibrium in net-utilities. Both rms' best response
curves in net-utilities cross and the slopes of the isoprot curves are horizontal. By def-
9Note that gure 4.2 is in fw2; w1g-space, hence the isoprot's slope is vertical.
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Figure 4.3: Utility Strategy vs. Subscription Fee Strategy
inition, F1(w
) and F2(w) also intersect at A. These curves constitute all (w1; w2)-
combinations where F1 = F2 = F
 as dened in prop 4.1.
An equilibrium in subscription fees is constructed in point B of gure 4.2. The line
Fi(wF ) in gure 4.2 represents all (w2; w1)-combinations for which Fi = F

F , the optimal
subscription fee in (4.11). Given Fi = F

F the isoprot curve that is tangent to Fi(wF )
yields maximal prot.
The conclusions for a given mark-up m are similar to those of Cheng (1985) for the
case of Cournot and Bertrand competition. Since the all iso-subscription fee curves have a
positive slope and the characteristics of isoprot curves, all points of tangency have to lie
below Rw1 and to the left of R
w
2 . It is easy to see that this implies both lower net-utilities
and higher prots for at least one rm10 in equilibrium.
Figure 4.3 derives the dominant strategy contract form for a given mark up m. Firm
10Cheng (1985) recognizes the fact that for asymmetrical demands the Cournot equilibrium can be such
that one rm realizes less prots than in a Bertrand equilibrium. The same scenario is possible with
subscription fee competition. Figure 4.2 however excludes this possibility.
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i's choice of strategic variable induces rm j's conjectures, hence it denes rm j's reaction
function.
In gure 4.3, rm i's best response function if net utilities are strategic variables is
denoted by Rwi . Firm i's best response to any subscription fee Fj R
F
i is given by the point
of tangency of rm i's isoprot curve and rm j's iso-subscription fee curve. From the
discussion above, it is clear that these points need to be located below Rw1 for rm one
and to the left of Rw2 for rm 2. A point of intersection of the subscription fee reaction
curves denes a subscription fee equilibrium, i.e. point B in gure 4.3. If rm i commits
to compete in subscription fees and rm j in net-utility levels, the equilibrium is given by
the intersection of Rwi and R
F
j . These are depicted by points C and D in gure 4.3.
Suppose that rm 1 chooses net-utility levels as a strategic variable, hence rm 2's
relevant best response curve is Rw2 . If rm 2 also competes in net-utility levels, point A is
the resulting equilibrium, because rm 1's relevant best response curve is Rw1 , both rms
realizes wwi = 
ww for all i = f1; 2g. If rm 2 commits to net-utility levels as strategic
variable, RF1 is rm 1's reaction curve. Because of the shape of rm 1's isoprot curves,
the point of intersection of Rw2 and R
F
1 has to be below A. In this case, rm 2 realizes
higher prots, hence using net-utility levels as strategic variable is dominated for rm 2.
Suppose that rm 1 commits to subscription fees as strategic variable. This implies
that rm 2's best response is given by RF2 . If rm 2 also chooses a subscription fee as his
strategic variable, the resulting equilibrium is certainly given by point B, yielding prots
of FF2 .
If rm 2 picks net-utility levels instead, rm 1 faces Rw1 . The equilibrium fw1; w2g
combination is given by the point of tangency of F1(w) and rm 2's isoprot curve that
happens to be located on Rw1 . Because of the shape of isoprot curves, this necessarily
has to be above B. Hence choosing net-utility levels as strategic variable is dominated by
choosing subscription fees.
The above results are derived by treatingm 2] 1; 0] as a constant parameter. However,
m is also to the digression of the rms. Nevertheless it is easy to see, that choosing
subscription fees is still a dominant strategy for either rm, if m is variable. Suppose
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there exists a m^ 2]  1; 0] such that
Fwi (m^)  Fwi (m) 8 m 2]  1; 0]:
We already know that FFi (m) > 
Fw
i (m), 8 m 2]  1; 0] hence FFi (m^) > Fwi (m^). But
since FFi (m
) > FFi (m) 8 m 2] 1; 0], choosing subscription fees with m = m is indeed
the unique equilibrium of the game depicted in table 4.1.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a mechanism which vaporizes the collusive nature of the access charge
in the presence of on and o-net price discrimination by using a special form of a nonlinear
tari. It also forms a link between the literature on network interconnection and the
comparison of price and quantity competition. The three major ndings of the paper are:
i. By committing to utilities instead of prices, the sensitivity of the residual subscrip-
tion demand is altered as compared to the case of committing to subscription fees.
This aects the equilibrium values of net-utility/subscription fees. Hence, in the
presence of network eects, price and utility competition are not equivalent.11
ii. The equilibrium net-utility level oered to consumers is independent of the access
charge when rms commit to utilities. Hence, the access charge chosen by prot
maximizing rms and the socially optimal level coincide. This is not the case in
models of network competition with price discrimination and two-part taris.
iii. Competing in subscription fees is dominant to competing in net-utility levels.
The paper suggests that the regulator should impose competition in net utilities instead
of subscription fees. If they do so, there will be an equilibrium which immediately results in
the socially optimal outcome. Even though these results are very intriguing, competition
in utilities in its pure form is not used in practice. Although many reasons for its non-
existence in reality can be brought forward, we only want to highlight two.
The rst one is suggested by the paper itself. If rms had to decide between utility
and subscription fee competition, the paper argues that the latter dominates the former.
11This has been realized by Armstrong (2002a) in the context of two-sided markets.
UTILITY VS. FIXED FEE 109
Hence, prot maximizing rms clearly refrain from competing in utilities. However, the
analysis in Cheng (1985) and Singh and Vives (1984) suggests that quantity competition
dominates price competition, but it would be ignorant to argue that price competition
does not exist. The mode of competition is certainly not only subject to the rms interest.
Pricing strategies and habits rather evolved over time. Hence the analysis of the paper
suggests that it is in the rms' best interest to engage in xed fee competition, but there
are certainly other factors that inuence that decision.
The second obstacle is the more obvious one | at least at rst sight. Net utilities
are a theoretical concept and hence, it is almost impossible to directly implement such a
pricing scheme. Certainly, no telecommunication rm would advertise its network with
the words: \Subscribe now and get 10 utilis a month!".
This problem is not unique to the present proposition. For example, although it is
theoretically true that network usage has a marginal cost (other than causing congestion),
we use proxies and techniques to recover estimates. We implicitly assume that these proxies
draw a suciently accurate picture of the world and accept our inability to directly observe
marginal cost.
In our model net-utility is essentially a function of the amount of people that one can
reach via its network. In that case the number of calls dropped and network reach in
particular can be used as proxies. These are measurable and veriable. As a matter of
fact reliability is at least a marketing instrument in the US. Verizon Wireless advertises
its mobile network with the slogan, \The most reliable network".
Since pure contracts based on net-utility seem to be far fetched (at least for now), mixed
contracts of some measure of utility and xed fee pricing could be more realistic. A natural
extension of the model are supply functions. These have been studied extensively for the
case of price and quantity competition (Look at Grossman (1981) and Klemperer and
Meyer (1989) for further references.) Further research would need to identify consequences
of the use of supply functions on the equilibrium access charge.
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4.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Dierentiating (4.5) with respect to pi and pij and taking into
account that v0(p) =  q(p) yields rst-order conditions given by
2i (pi   c)q0(pi) = 0;
ij(pij   (1 +m)c)q0(pij) = 0;
implying the per unit retail price given in part [i.].
Dierentiating (4.5) with respect to wi, and substituting the retail prices from part [i.],
and imposing symmetry, the rst-order condition of rm i determining wi can be written
as
(wi; wj)v(c)  (wi; wj)wi   (wi; wj)f   1
2
= 0:
Solving this equation for wi yields the expression given in part [ii.].
In order to compute the subscription fee, one has to plug in w into (4.3). solving for
Fi leads to [iii.] in proposition 4.1.
Proof Corollary 4.1. The net-utility level in (4.9) follows immediately by plugging in (4.8)
in Proposition 4.1. The second order condition is given by
2( mcq((1 +m)c) + 

v(c)  v((1 +m)c)

  1) < 0
which proofs the corollary.
Proof of proposition 4.2. In order to proof that m = 0 is indeed optimal, we have to
dierentiate (4.10) with respect to m. Again, taking into account that v0(p) =  q(p) gives
the following rst-order condition
1
4
mc
@q((1 +m)c)
@m
= 0
observing that @q((1 +m)c)=@m < 0 and c > 0 we have m = 0 as the unique solution,
which is stated in proposition 4.2.
Furthermore observe that the second derivative of (4.10) is given by
1
4
c
@q((1 +m)c)
@m
+
1
4
mc
@2q((1 +m)c)
@m2
:
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This is always smaller then zero if
mc 7   @q((1 +m)c)=@m
@2q((1 +m)c)=@m2
depending on whether @2q((1 +m)c)=@m2 ? 0. For m = 0 this is always true.
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